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I. INTRODUCTION
I write about violence as naturally as Jane Austen wrote about manners. Violence
shapes and obsesses our society, and if we do not stop being violent we have no
future. People who do not want writers to write about violence want to stop them
writing about us and our time. It would be immoral not to write about violence.
Edward Bond'
The truth must always be respected whatever consequence it might bring.
2
Antonio Gramsci

The unfortunate truth claim which I wish to pursue in this
paper is that the deep structural presupposition (which is almost
universal amongst lawyers and clearly dominant among lay people)

that law and violence stand in stark opposition is false. 3 I argue that
violence is endemic to any conception of modern law, that it is
authorized by the legislature and/or executive, sanctioned by the
judiciary, and perpetrated by what are euphemistically called the
forces of law and order - the police, the military et cetera. In brief,
I wish to posit the disquieting thought that legal violence is a sine
qua non of advanced western society.

This paper develops an argument to reinforce this critical
claim. As a theory the paper is intended to do two things. First, to
explain my own personal experiences with a legal system and, after
some reflection, I hope, your own also. 4 Second, it seeks to
1 Edward Bond, Lear (London: Eyre Methuen, 1979) at v.
2 Antonio Gramsci, "La Converenza e la verita" Avanti! (19 February 1916) cited in
Joseph Femia, Gramsci's Political Thought (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981) at 165.
3 A number of people in both Ireland and Canada have contributed to this paper at
different times and in different ways. As usual not all can be mentioned, but I would like to
express particular gratitude to Toni Pickard and Donald Galloway whose (de)(con)structive
criticisms made this paper what it isn't. Special thanks also to John Whyte, Phil Goldman and
Jerome Bickenbach at Queen's University at Kingston, Allan Hutchinson and Hans Mohr at
Osgoode Hall Law School. Margaret Hess and Denise Boissoneau made it accessible. Thanks
also to my parents. Finally, mention should be made of Sandy Dobrowolsky without whose
criticisms, support, enthusiasm and reassurance this paper would never have been completed.
All the usual disclaimers apply.
4 At this point it is appropriate to confess my Northern Irish background, and to explain
that my quest for theory arises out of the failure of traditional jurisprudence to adequately
explain and justify the vicious nature of my native legal system. For one recent scholarly
discussion of certain activities see R.J. Spjut, 'The 'Official' Use of Deadly Force by the
Security Forces against Suspected Terrorists: Some Lessons From Northern Ireland" [1986]
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transcend the "stifling debate" between Liberalism and traditional
Marxism in both its economistic or instrumentalist forms.5

I shall

begin by outlining a theory of the modern state as the material
condensation of social relations which has as its primary purpose the
maintenance of cohesion through a subtle interplay of what can be
called hegemonic processes and coercion. On this foundation I
proceed to develop an Interactional Theory of Law, outline some of
the functions which modern law fulfills, and suggest an explanation
of the relationship between these various functions. I will conclude

with a few brief comments on what I see to be the significance of
my argument.
II. THE STATE

6

A state which dwarfs its men (sic) in order that they may become more docile
instruments in its hands even for beneficial purposes will find that with small men
7
no great thing can be accomplished!
John Stuart Mill

A. From Reification to Relationalism
Given that our object of analysis, the state, is complex and
sophisticated, any theory which takes the state seriously must also be

Pub. L. 38. One further introductory comment should be made; my research and reflection
indicates that Northern Ireland is not an unfortunate exception - rather it is liberal democratic
state and law writ large! Self-righteous complacency is unjustified.

5 Reduced to its most simple form, Instrumentalist Marxism suggests that both state and
law are malleable tools in the hands of the dominant elite. Economistic Marxism suggests that
state and law are superstructural, and hence epiphenomenal reflections of a determinative
economic base.
6 This section introduces new concepts and analyses of the state and social relations
which may seem strange to lawyers; I would therefore bring to the readers attention the
following Gramscian canon of interpretation:
When a theorist presents a whole series of concepts and principles of explanation
concerned with a particular problem, they must be considered as a connected and
a reciprocally qualifying system rather than located in isolation or in a unilateral
fashion.
Bob Jessop, The CapitalistState (London: Martin Robinson, 1981) at 144.
7 j.S. Mill, On Liberty.
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complex and sophisticated if it wishes to be comprehensive. The
reader should therefore treat the concepts which are introduced
here as a group of interrelated and balancing "thought constructs"
which serve as heuristic devices for a better understanding of
contemporary society and state. As Poulantzas suggests:
The final aim of the process of thought is the production of the most concrete
concepts ... which allow knowledge of real, concrete, particular objects, namely
social formations always original in each case. This logical order, leading from the

most abstract to the most concrete concepts ... allows a concrete analysis of a
concrete situation.8

Law can only be understood in context, as part of the
broader moral, political, social, economic, philosophical,
psychological, sexual, and ecological spectrum. To believe otherwise
is to be a jurispudential navelgazer. At the same time, however, it
is not possible to discuss everything at once. I therefore propose
to approach law from the political perspective, or more specifically,
through a theory of the state. I am not claiming that this is the
correct or only approach to law, rather, I suggest that this is the
most useful approach for my present purposes.9 The theory of the
state is intended to provide a framework for the analysis of law, and
the theory of law, in turn, reinforces the theory of the state. There
is a homology between state and law.
Liberalism and traditional Marxism tend to have a rather
technical conception of the state: they treat it as an entity, either
personalizing or commodifying it. Liberalism, working on an

8 Nicos Poulantzas, PoliticalPower and Social Classes (London: Verso, 1973) at 17-18

[hereinafter P.P.S.C]. It is important to make explicit my intellectual indebtedness to
Poulantzas. His work is significant for two reasons: first, he has developed the most advanced
analysis and critique of the state in contemporary political theory. Second, Poulantzas' own
academic history includes doctoral studies in law, which on completion he abandoned (and
ultimately rejected) to deal with the more pressing question of the nature and functions of the
capitalist state. However, as Jessop points out in his excellent critical intellectual biography
Nicos Poulantzas: Marxist Theory and PoliticalStrategy (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985)
Poulantzas' interest in law was a "continuing subterranean influence." Ibid. at 26-50, 322-325.
9 See Robert A. Samek, The Legal Point of View (New York:

Philosophical Library,

1976). One of my express purposes in this paper is to challenge the legalization of politics
(H. Glasbeek & M. Mandel, "The Legalization of Politics in Advanced Capitalism: The
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms" in R. Martin, ed., Critical Perspectives on the

Constitution (Winnipeg: Society for Socialist Studies, 1984) and in 2 Socialist Stud. 84) by
emphasizing the inherent politicization of law.
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assumption of consensus, 10 portrays the state as a subject, the

neutral arbitrator and great leveller above and beyond the mass of
social interaction."
Traditional Marxism, on the other hand,
working on an assumption of conflict, portrays the state as an object,
a malleable instrument in the hands of the ruling class for
dominating the working class. Both approaches not only oversimplify and are ideal typical but also misunderstand and
mischaracterize the nature of the state. I suggest that we must "flick

the switch," that we stop thinking of the state as a thing - subject
or object - and that we recognize the state as relational.
Drawing on, but substantially adapting, Marx's theory of
alienation, 12 a strong argument can be made that our awareness of

10 This assumption of consensus is very powerful.

It argues that because we are all

citizens of the same society, and belong to the same culture, there is basically only one
perspective on events. Some social scientists have called this a "central value system." This
view denies any major discrepancies between the different social groups or between maps of
meaning in a society. A conceptual viewpoint such as this has very important political
consequences; it assumes that we all have the same interests in society (for example peace,
order and good government), and that we all have a roughly equal share of power in society.
The assumption portrays western liberal democratic societies as if there were no major cultural
or economic breaks, and no major conflicts of interests between various classes or social
groups. The assumption implies that our political institutions - Parliament, the two or three
party system, universal suffrage, et cetera - guarantee equal access and participation for all in
the decision-making process. Finally it assumes that the Rule of Law protects us all equally.
The assumption leads to the belief that for whatever disagreements that do exist, there are
legitimate and institutionalized means for expressing and reconciling them. Although it does
concede that there may be differences of outlook, argument and even opposition, it assumes
that these all take place within a broader framework of agreement - our shared experience
of democracy - to which everyone subscribes.
11 For a paradigm example of this assumption of consensus and a vision of an essentially
harmonious society see Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press,
1986) which portrays the state as a neutral, if pluralist, subject capable of incorporating and
accommodating a wealth of diverse social desires and interests. For a rather sceptical
response to the ideal of consensus, see Michael Mann, 'The Social Cohesion of Liberal
Democracy" (1970) 35 Am. Soc. Rev. 423.
12 See for example, my unpublished LL.M. Thesis "Law State and Violence" (Queen's
University, Kingston, 1984) at 85-94. See in particular, Karl Marx, The Economic and
PhilosophicManuscriptsof 1844 (Moscow: Progress Books, 1977); Bertell Ollman,Alienation:
Marx's Conception of Man in CapitalistSociety (London: Cambridge University Press, 1971);
Kostas Axelos, Alienation Praxis and Techne in the Thought of Karl Marx (Austin: University
of Texas Press, 1976); Joachim Israel, Alienation from Marx to Modem Society (Boston: Allyn
and Bacon, 1971); Ernest Mandel & George Novack, The Marxist Theory of Alienation (New
York: Pathfinder Press, 1973); and Istevan Mezaros, Marx's Theory of Alienation (London:
Merlin Press, 1972).

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[voL. 27 No. 2

our common humanity has disintegrated; that "anxious privitism" and
stereotypical notification are hallmarks of contemporary society, and
that, at best, we live in a world that has fragmented into a plethora
of interest groups. Therefore, as against Marx, there are not just
two great camps, the bourgeoisie and the working class; rather these
groups or classes have themselves become fragmented.
The
bourgeoisie is currently composed of large land owners, nonmonopoly capital (with its commercial, industrial, and banking
fractions), monopoly capital, the national bourgeoisie, and the
international bourgeoisie.13 Similarly the working class has also split
between the aristocracy of labour, technicians, labourers, the
unemployed and the unemployable. Other groups such as the
bureaucracy and intellectuals gain their identity independent of
economic factors. Furthermore, from a different perspective, there
are "pluriclassite" groups whose interests also transcend class
boundaries - groups based upon nationality, religion, ethnicity,
culture and gender. Finally, it may not be too much to suggest that
contemporary society is pervaded by a sense of "contradictory
consciousness" which Bob Jessop describes as:
a condition in which, on the one hand, there is consensus across all classes and all
party groups on dominant values, elites and institutions at the symbolic level ...
;on
the other hand ...
disaffection and dissent is particulary marked in the subordinate
classes who have confused and ambivalent attitudes towards the dominant economic,
social and political order. 14

More specifically, Joseph Femia, synthesizing the research of
Almond and Verba, W. G. Runciman, Almond and Silver, Rodman
and several other sources, argues that contradictory consciousness is
empirically valid:
Drawing these survey results together, it would seem that the average man(sic)
tends to have two levels of normative reference, the abstract and the situational.
On the former he expresses a great deal of agreement with the dominant ideology;
on the latter he reveals not outright dissent but a diminished level of commitment

13 For a discussion of bourgeois fractionalization in Canada, see Reg Whitaker, "Images
of the State in Canada" in Leo Panitch, ed., The Canadian State (Toronto, University of
Toronto Press, 1977) at 28.
14 B. Jessop, Traditionalism, Conservatism and British PoliticalCulture (London: Allen
and Unwin, 1974). For a less academic, if tentative, recognition of contradictory consciousness
in Canada, see "A National Report Card" Maclean's (6 January 1986).
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to the bourgeois ethos because it is often inappropriate to the eigencies of his class

but
position. Serious discontent and militant postures often come to the surface,
15
they are not accompanied by a realistic appraisal of alternative structures.

Following Gramsci, and more particularly Poulantzas, it is
argued that the state should be conceived of as a material
condensation of the alienated social relations of contemporary
society.16 The purpose of the state is to serve as a factor of social
cohesion, to keep society together, to prevent it from becoming
irrevocably fragmented and thereby, ultimately, to maintain social
relations as currently constituted. The argument can be put another
way, in perhaps less jargon laden terms. It seems to me that people
express their different ideas and attempt to achieve their ideals
through certain material apparatuses such as legislatures, courts,
banks, universities, hospitals, trade unions, the church, the media,
the family et -cetera. To achieve a goal, one directs one's efforts to
a particular, or a variety of, state apparatuses. The state is a vital
way in which people go about organizing their mutual interaction.
This relational interpretation undermines Liberal pluralism
which tends to view the state as a distinct, neutral arbitrator. 17 On
the contrary, the state is the very locus where conflicts occur and
battles are fought.18 As Poulantzas succinctly comments:
Conceiving the state as a relation, as being structurally shot through and constituted
with and by class contradictions, means firmly grasping the fact that...the state is
block,
destined to produce class divisions and not really be a monolithic fissureless
19
but is itself by virtue of its very structure (state as relation) divided.

15 Supra, note 2 at 223.
The state is'a relationship of forces, or more precisely, the material condensation
of such a relationship among classes and class fractions such as this is expressed
within the state in a necessarily specific form.
Poulantzas, State, Power and Socialisn (London: New Left-Books, 1979) at 128-29 [hereinafter
S.P.S.].
16

17

W.L. MacKenzie King, Industry and Humanity (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,

1973).
18 See, for example, Bernard Edelman, Otwnership of the Image (London: Routledge &
Kegan Paul, 1979).
19 "Reply to Miliband and Laclau" (1976) 95 New Left Rev. 63 at 74-75.
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The state, as a factor of social cohesion, reflects and
condenses all the contradictions of a society as alienated and
mutually contradictory as is the capitalist one. Moreover, political
practice becomes the practice of a political class or social group, and
state power is always the power of a definite class or group to
whose interests the state corresponds.20 The relational theory
therefore denies the validity of the consensus approach because
cohesion is achieved neither through unanimous agreement nor
mutual compromise, but, as we shall see, through a dialectic of
hegemonic processes and coercion.
The relational approach also denies the instrumentalist view,
for although the state may serve the long term interests of the
dominant class or group, it need not always "cohese" in favour of
that group. As Leo Panitch pithily suggests, the state does not act
at the behest of the bourgeoisie or one of its factions, but on their
behalf.21 By managing the inherent contradictions of contemporary
society, it maintains the political conditions necessary for continuing
the capitalist mode of production. This necessitates a state that is
at least partially responsive to the needs and demands of the
working classes and other pluriclassite groups in a post-industrial
society.
This is not, however, a pluralist argument; it neither
perceives all groups as having equal influence, nor does it claim that
the state's policies are a reflection of everyone's mutually qualified
interests.22 Empirical research from a variety of sources 23 has
comprehensively undermined pluralistic claims and these can be

20 Jessop, supra, note 6 at 61.
21 L. Panitch, The Canadian State, supra, note 13 at 4.
22 Two classic statements of the pluralist positions are Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to
University of Chicago Press, 1956); and Joseph Sehumpeter,

Democratic Theory (Chicago:

Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1942).
23 Ralph Miliband, The State in CapitalistSociety (London:

Weidenfeld and Nicholson,

1969); John Porter, The Vertical Mosaic (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965);
Wallace Clements, The Canadian Corporate Elite (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1975); Gustavus Myres, History of Canadian Wealth (New York: Argosy-Antiquarian, 1968).
For a useful overview in the Canadian context, see L. Panitch, "Elites, Class and Power in
Canada" in Whittington & Williams eds, Canadian Politics in the 1980's, 3d ed. (Toronto:

Methuen, 1981) at 229.
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reinforced by a brief analysis of the concept of a "Power Bloc"
which'provides theoretical support for such empirical refutations.
As argued earlier, the state fulfills its basic purpose of
maintaining social relations through its cohesive role. One of the
ways in which the state attempts to cement society together is
through the creation of a "hegemonic condition," a situation of
widespread spontaneous consent and acquiescence. The concept of
the power bloc explains one of the ways in which certain sections of
24
the social ensemble consent to the capitalist social formation.
Within modern social relations the dominant bourgeois class factions
recognize that the maintenance of the capitalist mode of production
is mutually beneficial. They wish to maintain the capitalist mode of
production and they modify their interaction so that it will not
transcend the limits necessary for the continuation of these
relationships. These groups come together in form of the power
bloc.
However, within the power bloc there is a continual vying
for position between the various bourgeois factions,25 so that
whichever faction becomes dominant has the majority of its policies
fulfilled. The nature of the state changes the various permutations
in the nature of the power bloc, but still remains the capitalist state.
For example, when the power bloc was dominated by the national,
non-monopoly bourgeoisie, the role of the state was predicated on
a laissez-faire philosophy. However, with the ascendency of
monopoly capitalism the state's role has become strikingly
interventionist. The predominant group in the power bloc can be
described as the "hegemonic faction" in so far as it is in a position
of leadership and the policies adopted by the state usually
correspond to its interests. This, however, is neither instrumentalism
nor economism. The other factions within the power bloc "modify"
the excesses of the hegemonic faction, and the power bloc as a
whole is constrained in fulfilling only its own interests by the
requirement of fostering hegemony in order to gain consent. The
hegemonic faction does not use the state to further its own
24 See Poulantzas, P.P.S.C, supra, note 8 at 296-303.

25 For an account of factionalization within Canada, see Reg Whitaker "Images of the
State in Canada" in L. Panitch, supra, note 13 at 28.
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interests; rather it is the most powerful of all the social groups both
within and without the power bloc. The other groups within the
power bloc accept the preeminence of the hegemonic faction
because it maintains social relations as currently constituted, but at
the same time vie for the coveted position themselves. They only
accept the hegemonic faction because many of their interests are
being fulfilled due to the continuation of the capitalist mode of
production. Viewed in this light, the power bloc itself is a
manifestly unstable equilibrium.
The instability of the power bloc provides an important
insight as to why liberalism provides "the best possible political
shell"26 for capitalism. In order to become a hegemonic faction a
social group requires allies to bolster its position. Since other
groups within the power bloc covet the same position they are
patently unreliable, therefore the hegemonic faction seeks alliances
with other social groups outside the power bloc. This means that
both the hegemonic faction and non-hegemonic factions form
alliances with non-power bloc groups intending to further their own
interests. In order that non-power bloc allies have influence (and
also to induce them into alliances in the first place), they must have
some real power. Representative democracy, parliament, trade
unions, suffrage, rights and other welfare-statist type policies are
institutions through which these groups realize their power.27 Liberal
democratic institutions do provide real benefits and sources of power
for other social groups which allow them to impose limitations on
the power bloc and the hegemonic fraction. These are not simply
palliatives designed to obscure bourgeois domination (as
instrumentalist Marxist's have argued); they are, as E. P. Thompson
has suggested, "unqualified human goods."28 They arise out of the
inherent incapacity of the bourgeoisie to develop sufficient unity
which would enable them to control by sheer oppression. To gain
supremacy the dominant classes are forced to compromise;
compromises which further exacerbate the instability of equilibrium.

26 Lenin, The State and Revolution (Peking: The Foreign Language Press, 1976).
27 Ralph Miliband, "Poulantzas and the Capitalist State" (1973) 82 New Left Rev. 83.
28 Whigs and Hunters (New York: Pantheon Books, 1975) at 266.
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Three important consequences emerge from the relational
theory of the state. As a preliminary point, it must be made clear
that I am not offering a general theory of the state for the simple
reason that such a general theory is impossible to attain. Contrary
to some liberal interpretations, the state is not an a priori
determinant, but rather it is determined by a host of social, political,
economic and ideological forces which are in continual flux.
Different types of state exist in different politico-historical
conjunctures. The theory
offered here is a theory of the state in
29
society.
post-industrialist
Second, the relational theory requires an expansion of the
term state, one which rejects the dichotomy of state and civil society.
As Gramsci argues,
...
the general notion of the state includes elements which need to be referred back

to the notion of civil society (in the sense that one might say that the State =
political society + civil society, in other words, hegemony protected by the armour

of coercion).

0

If, at this stage, hegemony is taken to mean economic, political,
intellectual and moral leadership, 3 1 and we accept that the role of
the state is one of cohesion, then it becomes clear that any
dichotomy of state and civil society is false. Gramsci realized that
there was a crucial interconnection and overlap of the two levels
because "the state" could also serve hegemonic functions, and "civil
society" could serve coercive functions. Further, the expanded
theory directly challenges the public/private distinction which is
fundamental to liberal theory.3 2
29 Poulantzas, P.P.S.C, supra, note 8 at 19.
30 Antonio Gramsci, Selections from Prison Notebooks, by Nowell-Smith & Hoare eds,
(London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1971) at 262-63 [hereinafter S.P.N.].

31 Ibid at 45.
32 See R. Cotterrell, Introduction to the Sociology of Law (Toronto: Butterworths, 1984)
at 135. See also Roberto Unger, Law in Modem Society (New York: Free Press, 1976) at
200ff; Duncan Kennedy, "The Stages of Decline of the Public-Private Distinction" (1982) 130
U. Pa. L. Rev. 1349; Boaventura de Sousa Santos, "Law and Community: The Changing
Nature of State Power in Late Capitalism" in Rick Abel, ed., The Politicsof Informal Justice:

VoL I The American Experience (New York: Academic Press, 1982). From a corporatist
perspective, see J.T. Winkler, "Law, State and Economy: The Industry Act 1975 in Context"
(1975) 2 Brit. J. L. & Soc'y 102. But see also Leo Panitch, 'The Role and Nature of the
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Third, the relational theory of the state demands some
account of the relationship between politics and economics. It is
suggested that the relationship be conceived of as one of "relative
autonomy." Economic developments should be considered to be of
primary importance, creating the "developmental directive" 33 or what
Gramsci calls, "the basic trajectory of human history." However,
while changes in economic productive forces are of primary
importance, it is vital to emphasize that political, ideological, legal
and cultural forces are by no means devoid of independent
influence. The modern state is not a reflexive instrument designed
to facilitate the economic interests of the dominant social groups.
Indeed, "... at certain moments the automatic thrust due to the

economic factor is slowed down, obstructed or even momentarily
closed down."34 On this view economic factors are by no means
decisive because as Femia posits, "economic crises only create a
terrain more favourable to the diffusion of certain modes of thought,
certain ways of posing and resolving questions concerning the entire
subsequent development of national life."35
Furthermore, the concept of relative autonomy is also
useful to explain the relationship between state apparatuses and
contemporary social struggles. As I indicated earlier, the various
state apparatuses are not the simple instruments of any particular
class or class faction; yet, in the long term, they do tend to preserve
the capitalist mode of production in that their basic function is
cohesion, (that is, to temper excesses, smooth out the rough edges
and keep the reproduction turning). Cohesion, as will become clear,
is achieved through the subtle interplay of coercion and hegemonic
processes. The latter aims to satisfy as many of the sectional groups
as possible within contemporary society without affecting the
essential economic necessities of the dominant mode of production.
By definition this means that no one group has absolute control

Canadian State' in Panitch, supra, note 13 at 6-7.
33 Thomas Mathieson, Law, Society and PoliticalAction (Toronto:

1980).
34 Femia, supra, note 2 at 116.

35 Ibid. at 117.

Academic Press,
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over a state apparatus since absolutism would jeopardize the basic
function of cohesion. This will become clear in the next section.
To sum up the argument to this point, the state must be
conceived of as a continual process of the formation of unstable
equilibria between the interests of the various social groups in
society - but the balance is such that the interests of the dominant
class or group tend to prevail. However, the equilibrium can never
be made stable because the situation of complete hegemony can
never be attained due to the contradictions of modern society;
contradictions which hegemony ultimately exacerbates. The modern
state is not a monolith; rather it is a strategic, contestable terrain
and, as such, should be understood as a continuing sequence of
unstable equilibria. Cohesion seeks to moderate this instability by
one of two forms: through the creation of hegemony or through
the invocation of coercion.
B.

Hegemony

Hegemony is one of the most bandied about terms in
modern social, political, moral and legal theory. It is imperative that
we clarify its meaning as early as possible. In my interpretation,
hegemony is a condition to be attained; a situation of political,
moral, economic and intellectual leadership.
The hegemonic
condition is one in which all members of society "spontaneously
consent"37 to the social structure. Consent is a degree of conscious
attachment to, agreement with, or willingness to accept, the
legitimacy of a certain society. A situation of perfect hegemony
would be one of perfect cohesion.
Hegemony is quite distinct form the processes which lead to
its creation, but for convenience, it is appropriate to call them
"hegemonic processes" if it is remembered that they are means, not
ends. This distinction can be demonstrated through an analysis of

36 The reader may be dissatisfied with my obviously superficial discussion of relative
autonomy. However, I concretize my conception in the ensuing analysis of law. See, infra at
249-54.
37

S.P.N., supra, note 30 at 95.
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the relationship between hegemony and ideology.38 Marx only
39
developed the concept of ideology as far as "false consciousness
in that he believed that each class has its own ideology. Thus, for
example, he indicated that if the proletariat adopted the values,
beliefs and lifestyle of the bourgeoisie, then they had been seduced
into a false consciousness. This interpretation portrays ideologies as
"political numberplates"40 which people carry on their backs since
ideology is understood to be specific to each class. Such an
approach is inadequate because it implies two things: first, it
assumes some sort of conspiracy on the part of the ruling class to
"brainwash" the other classes. Second, it envisions ideology as being
merely ideas, tinted glasses which obscure "the reality." On the
contrary, ideology should be interpreted from the perspective of its
contribution to the creation of a hegemonic situation for a particular
class, class faction, or social group. Following Althusser we should
conceive of "ideology as materiality."41 Ideologies exist. They are
concrete, constitutive elements of the social and material relations
of society. They are lived relations. As Sumner argues,
[ideology] is an integral and substantive element of all social practice. It is an
active force within all aspects of social development and not2 just an animal that
roams around the ephemeral reserves of the superstructure.

Ideologies are not the tinted glasses through which we see the
world, but rather they are the ways in which the world operates. By
descending into the arena of social relations they become active
determinants of social interaction. They are both creations and
creators of social exchange.
38 The ensuing discussion of hegemony and ideology makes it clear that the vision of the
state being presented in much broader than the "repressionlideological deception" couplet.
Most importantly it emphasizes the creative, proactive role of ideology. This will become
even more explicit in the discussion of law as ideology.
39 Karl Marx & Friedrich Engels, The German Ideolog (1845) in Marx and Engels:
Selected Works (Moscow: Progress Publications, 1970) vol. II at 178. For an excellent
discussion of the history and various interpretations of the concept of ideology, see Centre for
Contemporary Cultural Studies, On Ideology (London: Hutchinson, 1978).
40 Poulantzas, P.P.S.C, supra, note 8 at 202.
41 "Contradiction and Overdetermination" in For Marx (London: Allen Lane, 1969).
42 Colin Sumner, Reading Ideologies (New York: Academic Press, 1979) at 290.
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An important consequence of this interpretation is that the
dominant ideology does not solely reflect the interests of the
dominant class. The dominant ideology, as an integral part of social
relations, will incorporate the ideals and interests of other social
groups. Thus, in a sense, ideologies are eclectic, incorporating
elements of "sub-ideologies." However, a dominant ideology will
remain dominant because society is not pluralist. Such an ideology
strives to maintain the social relations as currently constituted. 43
As a lived relation, ideology directly intervenes in the
reproduction of the relations of production. The dominant ideology
fulfills a practical social function in that it cements and unifies a
whole social block within each political-historical conjuncture.
Ideology can fulfill this role because it is not an external
obfuscation, but rather it is an internalized weltanschauung, which
turns out to be a self-fulfilling prophecy.44 Ideology cannot be
assessed in terms of whether it is true or false: the relevant criterion
is efficacy. Ideology depends on the extent of mass adhesion for its
validation.
In this light, it is possible to realize how ideology contributes
to the creation of a situation of hegemony because it generates "the
will to conform"45 and "spontaneous consent,"46 those two
characteristics which demonstrate that some class faction or social
group has attained hegemony. Ideology is a process, and hegemony
is a condition to which ideology contributes. 47 Hegemony, if it could
be achieved, would be the answer to the state's basic function as a
factor of cohesion. There would be widespread consensus (or at
least acquiescence), and social conflict would be minimized. But the
ideal is different from the reality. According to Femia's reading of
Gramsci there are three possible "levels" of hegemony: integral,

43 bid at 269-70.
44 Peter Gabel realizes this in his discussion of reification as being so interiorized that
it becomes the reality. See "Reification and Legal Reasoning" (1980) 3 Res. L. & Soc'y 97.
45 S.P.N., supra, note 30 at 260.
46 Ibid at 95.
47 1 will deepen and concretize the analysis of the relationship between ideology and
hegemony through a discussion of the ideological role of law. See infra at 256-66.
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decadent, and minimal. 48 Integral hegemony is the paradigm
condition where there is mass affiliation approaching almost absolute
commitment. Such a society would exhibit a substantial degree of
moral and intellectual unity, resulting in an "organic" unity or
communitarian relationship between the ruler and the ruled, a
relationship without contradictions or antagonisms on either a social
or ethical level. The inherently exploitative nature of postindustrial society negates the possibility of ever achieving such purity.
Decadent hegemony is a situation where the elite is
incapable of commanding unequivocable allegiance from the nonelite. Thus, the potential for social disintegration and conflict is
ever-present (at least beneath the surface). 49 In this situation the
non-elite do attain some benefits from the social structure but their
needs, mentality and inclinations are not truly in harmony with those
of the power bloc.
The lowest level of hegemony - minimal hegemony - rests

on the ideological unity of the economic, political and intellectual
elites, which are adverse to any infiltration by the popular masses.
Few of the interests of the subordinate groups are fulfilled, but such
a state staggers on by the co-option of the leaders of potentially
hostile groups, (cultural, political, social and economic). Such
groups are, therefore, "decapitated;" there is little or no commitment
to the social structure. Widespread alienation and a strong potential
for massive dissent is only thwarted by the capacity of the power
bloc to co-opt potentially radical leaders. At best only "primitive
50
rebellion" would be possible.
The important point to be taken from this analysis is that a
capitalist state, by its very nature, is unable to attain a situation of
integral hegemony. The state attempts to cement together modern
society in order to create a unity, but is precluded from achieving
its goal by the imperative of maintaining the capitalist mode of
production. Capitalism's contradictory social relations are further
48 Supra, note 2 at 46-49.
49 This surface is often determined by the media which often has very strong relations
with the power bloc.

50 Eric Hobsbawn, Primitive Rebels (Manchester. Manchester University Press, 1971).
Britain under the Thatcher regime may well be in this situation.
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complicated by the attempt to achieve hegemony, because its
attainment necessitates that real benefits be given to the subordinate
classes (for example, universal suffrage or the welfare state). These
in turn enable the subordinate classes to make even more demands
(since they are part of the expanded conception of the state) or put
extra burdens on the state's resources. Integral hegemony is
constitutively unachievable in capitalistic social relations.
Contemporary western liberal democratic societies are
therefore caught within a paradoxical situation. They are societies
based on inherently exploitative relationships which generate dissent,
anxiety, alienation and mutual antagonism. At the same time they
require at least acquiescence in order that the state can continue to
claim legitimacy for itself. The imperatives are stability and
preservation of the status quo. However, when these cannot be
achieved through the assimilation or accommodation of all members
of society, resort must be had elsewhere. In brief, hegemony is an
unattainable ideal because the contradictions are too great ... but

cohesion can still be maintained through coercion.
C.

Coercion
The critical path alone is still open to us.

Immanuel Kant5 1

Coercion has been much ignored in recent jurisprundential
debate. Not surprisingly liberals, emphasizing rights, have tended to
ignore this issue because it raises the spectre of a legitimation crisis.
What is perturbing, however, is that there has been a tendency in
recent radical arguments to underestimate the vital role which
coercion plays in the maintenance of society as currently constituted.
For example, the Frankfurt School, and in particular Herbert
Marcuse, has argued that ideology has been so successful in
smothering consciousness, that the class struggle no longer exists and
that the working class has been accommodated in late capitalism, as

51 Immanuel Kant, Kritik der Reinen Vemunft (Frankfurt: Werkausgabe, 1968) at B.D.
IV 712 cited in Hans Mohr, "Law and Learning Revisited" (1987) 25 Osgoode Hall L.J. 671.
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unidimensional "happy robots."5 2 Similarly, the Critical Legal Studies
movement in North America has latched onto the crucial ideological
role which law plays in the structuring of society. However, in their
commendable desire to escape the vulgar Marxist analysis of law as
a malleable instrument, they have ignored almost completely its
repressive aspects and have bent the stick too far in the other
direction. Even Poulantzas is guilty of this faux pas (at least in his
early works) due to his structuralist tendencies. These led him to
separate completely the economic, political and ideological "regions,"
thereby allowing him to concentrate almost exclusively on the
political region.53 Having narrowed his vision, he tended to see the
hegemony of the political region as being almost complete, and this
led him to ignore the extent of coercion inherent in modern society.
With his later rejection of structuralism and realization of the
interplay of the various regions, he ceased his preoccupation with
hegemony and tried to redress the balance with an analysis of
authoritarian statism.54 His efforts, as we shall see, were not wholly
successful.
Gramsci, who first developed the concept of hegemony as an
important factor in social reproduction,5 5 was not as seduced by this
concept as some of his successors. Although it is true that he
emphasized the vital position and role of hegemony throughout his
work, he also made constant reference to coercion and domination.
He continually stressed that there was a dialectical relationship
between hegemony and coercion. "For example, early in his
theoretical development, he outlined a brief analysis of the totality
of supremacy in a class society through what he described as the
interplay of "Direction and Domination":
...
[the] supremacy of a social group manifests itself in two ways, as domination, and
as intellectual and moral leadership. A social group dominates antagonistic groups

which it "tends to liquidate" or to subjugate even by armed force; it leads kindred
and allied groups.

52 One Dimensional Man (London:

Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1964).

53 P.P.S.C, supra, note 8.
54 S.P.S., supra, note 16 at part IV.

55 Perry Anderson, 'The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci" (1978) 100 New Left Rev. 4.
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A social group can, and indeed must, already exercise leadership before winning

it subsequently becomes dominant when it exercises
governmental power ...
5 6 power
but even if it holds it firmly in its grasp it must continue to lead as well.

Two points are pertinent in this quotation: it implies that dominance
is exerted over the enemy and direction is exercised over allies.
Further, and more importantly, it implies that once power has been
achieved, the two aspects of supremacy - direction and dominance
- are continued.

Gramsci is clearly arguing that direction (which is hegemony
in embryonic form) and domination are continually present in any
class state. By counterposing these, he is presenting a dual
perspective on how capitalist society reproduces itself, and by
emphasizing the former he is simply attempting to redress the
balance introduced by other more instrumentalist analyses. Gramsci
believed that a state which relied solely upon domination could not
last for long; but he also believed that in a class society there would
be dissent, that direction would not be adequate and that to
preserve its existence the state would have to resort to coercion.
For him political relations must be perceived as having, "...two
fundamental levels, corresponding to the dual nature of Machiavelli's
centaur-half animal, half human. They are the levels force and
57
consent, authority and hegemony, violence and civilization....*"
More specifically, he argues that with the occurrence of hegemonic
crisis 58 and the consequent threat to social order, there is resort to
violence by those who have greatest influence in the state
apparatuses:
This crisis creates situations which are dangerous in the short run...the traditional

ruling class which has numerous trained cadres...reabsorbs the control which was
slipping from its grasp...it retains power, reinforces it for the time being and uses
it to crush its adversary and dispense his leading cadres who cannot be very
59
numerous or highly trained.

56 Q. Hoare & G. Nowell Smith, Selections from Gransci'sPolitical Writings 1910-1920

(London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1977) at 57-58.
57 S.P.N., supra, note 30 at 169-70.
58 Ibid. at 210.
59 Ibid at 210-11.
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In this way, Gramsci continues, "the old society resists and ensures
itself breathing space by physically exterminating the elite of the
rival class and terrorizing its mass reserves., 60 Gramsci has,
therefore, made it very clear that absolute hegemony is impossible
and that when consensus is weak, coercion is always there to "save
the day" and preserve current society.
However, there is an ambiguity in his work which he never
clarifies. The argument outlined suggests that when hegemony is
strong, coercion is weak (or even non-existent), but when hegemony
is weak, coercion is strong. It implies that the nature of a particular
capitalist society can be identified by its proximity to either of the
extremes of the swing of a pendulum. It suggests a zero-sum
approach, in which the coercive role only becomes important in
situations of crisis. However, elsewhere in his work, he suggests that
coercion is in continuous operation:
The apparatus of state coercive power [is one] which legally enforces discipline on
those groups who do not "consent" either actively or passively. This apparatus is
however constituted for the whole of society in anticipation of moments of crisis of
command and direction when spontaneous consent has failed. 61

If this "simultaneous interpretation" of the relationship between
coercion and hegemony is his ultimate viewpoint, then it fits with his
vivid image of Machiavelli's centaur, in which the state is "both force
and consent, authority and hegemony, violence and civilita." 62
The ambiguity of the nature of the relationship between
hegemony and coercion is a major lacuna in Gramsci's theory of the
state. It fails to inform us as to whether the liberal democratic state
has as a constitutive element this necessity for coercion, or whether
it needs only to resort to coercion in cataclysmic situations. It also
fails to tell us whether a state which uses little coercion is different
in kind from a state which is more prone to use coercion.
Poulantzas has provided some answers to these questions.

60 Ibid at 185.
61 Ibid at 12.
62 Ann Showstack Sassoon, Gramsci's Politics (London: Croom Helm, 1980) at 112.
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In Fascism and Dictatorship63 and Crisis of the
Dictatorships,64 Poulantzas characterized fascism and military
dictatorships as "exceptional states" in contradistinction to "normal
states" because of their disregard for liberal institutions such as
suffrage, liberty, and the Rule of Law and also for their tendency to
rely on coercion and violence. In his last major work, State Power
and Socialism,65 Poulantzas argued that the modern state is a new
type of state, "an authoritarian state," which incorporates elements
of both the normal state and the "exceptional state."
The implications of his argument are that a normal state is
one where hegemony is strong and thus there is little need for
coercion, whereas an exceptional state is one in which hegemony is
weak and thus there is a greater need for coercion. This is
unobjectionable.
But the further implication is that the
intermediate, authoritarian state is a novel form of the capitalist
state, of very recent origins. This implies that the capitalist states of
classical liberalism and democratic liberalism up to the 1950s (or
perhaps ever later) which have never been fascist or governed by a
military dictatorship are normal; that is, coercion has only played a
very minor role in their continued existence. It implies that states
such as Ireland, Great Britain, United States, Canada et cetera have
been states in which coercion has played only a minimal role. This
is false. Coercion is, and has been, at least as important as the
hegemonic processes in achieving cohesion.
The source of Poulantzas' error lies in the structuralist
origins of his theory. His original overconcentration on the political
region led him to overestimate the capacity for the attainment of
hegemony. His later work became increasingly conscious of this.
He sought an explanation for the weakening of hegemony and the
increased intervention by the state in economic relations. 66 Such
intervention, he argued, undermines the state's appearance of
neutrality, causing greater dissent and disaffection, thereby

63 (London: New Left Books, 1976).
6 (London: New Left Books, 1976).
65 Supra, note 16.

66 See also Jurgen Habermas, Legitimation Crisis (Boston: Beacon Books, 1973).
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necessitating greater coercion to maintain stability. Thus, he
explained the emergence of authoritarian statism as being due, in
large part, to economic crises besetting the state.
There is undoubtedly much truth in this argument. But what
it ignores is that there have been many other reasons, apart from
economic factors, why consensus has never been achieved in a
capitalist society. This section has argued that the alienation caused
by the capitalist relations of production, (contradictory consciousness,
the existence of pluriclassite social groups based on ethnicity,
religion or gender, the inherent competition of the power bloc,
necessitating alliances with subordinate groups, and the granting of
democratic institutions), has exacerbated the contradictions and
prevented the realization of integral hegemony. In the absence of
such integral hegemony, the state must continue by resorting to
coercion.
Coercion and hegemony function simultaneously to
cement liberal democratic societies together. The modern state is
not the exceptional state, it is not fascist (as some on the left
argue), but neither is it, nor has it ever been, the normal, noncoercive, state. The liberal democratic state is an authoritarian state
in which coercion complements hegemony in a dialectical unity.
Within western liberal democratic society, hegemony and
coercion are opposing sides of the one coin. The destabilizing
factors are so great that coercion is essential in order to preserve
the equilibrium. Coercion is not relevant solely in situations of
crisis, apocalyptic or otherwise, but is continually present in the dayto-day flux of capitalist social relations. The reason why the liberal
democratic state is so efficacious for capitalist interaction and why
the capitalist state can manifest such "staying power" is due to its
capacity to resist challenge through the fusion of hegemonic
processes and coercion.
With this interpretation of the capitalist state, it is now
possible to progress to an analysis of the nature and function of law
in modern society. As we shall see, law is the apotheosis of
Liberalism's dialectical unity.
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III. LAW
A. An Interactional Theory of Law
... and so the essence of legislation does not lie in Subject or Object, in rights, or
in the idea of the domination of the collective will of the people ... but it lies in the
fact that the people who wield organized violence have power to compel others to
obey them ... so that the exact and irrefutable definition of legislation intelligible
to all, is that: Laws are rules made by people who govern by means of organized
violence, for non-compliance with which the non-complier is subjected to blows, to
loss of liberty, or even to being murdered. This definition furnishes the reply to
the question: What is it that renders it possible for people to make rules? The
same thing that makes it possible to establish laws, as enforces obedience to them,
namely, organized violence.
Leo Tolstoy6 7

The foregoing analysis of the nature of the contemporary
state is clearly very abstract with little discussion of the concrete
relations involved. The ensuing discussion of law builds upon and
adds flesh to this theoretical skeleton. Law, insofar as it plays a
crucial role in the interaction of people, is to be studied not for its
own sake but to further our knowledge of current society. Any
other approach is simply fetishistic. Neither legal liberalism nor
traditional radicalism sufficiently explains the multi-dimensionality of
law in contemporary society. The former because it is idealistic and
dishonest, and the latter because it is excessively deterministic,
reductionist and unsophisticated.
To understand the nature and functions of law in
contemporary society, we must approach it in the same way that we
approach the state, recognizing that law is a complex set of social
relations. Like society, the economy, state and ideology, law cannot
be treated as a static monolith. Law is not a thing; it too is
relational, part of the ensemble of social relations. It is a peculiar
and particular response to human and social interaction; one that
captures both the centrifugal and centripetal dynamics, the richness
and the poverty, the simplicity and the complexity, the correlations
and the contradictions of human interaction. Law is not merely
reactive. As a powerful form of (ir)rationality in contemporary
society law is an active agency, one which provides frameworks,
67 Leo Tolstoy, The Slaveiy of Our Times (London: John Lawrence, 1972) at 47.
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guidelines and direction for the structuring of human and social
relations. It is constitutive as much as it is reactive.68
A number of examples, drawn from the work of others,
provide support for this argument. Let us begin with Britain. The
Factory Act 1844 provides a useful illustration of the interactional
theory of law. This piece of legislation can be best understood as
a representative of several operative social forces at work in
nineteenth century English society; it was the result of the fusion of
contradictory processes and interests. The legislation came about for
two main reasons. First, the working class played a crucial role in
the achievement of the Factory Act through the activism of the
Chartist movement, and in particular its demands that the excesses
of child labour and overly long working hours be reduced. Second,
there were serious conflicts between the various bourgeois factions.
For example, manufacturers who had conformed with earlier laws on
the same subject sought protection from competitors who were
avoiding the constraints on child labour.
Further, other
manufacturers were seeking an alliance with the working classes in
order to force a repeal of the Corn laws. Finally, landlords favoured
increased wages because rent levels had become so low due to the
progressive impoverishment of the working classes. 69 The laws were
a legal response to an ad hoc social problem and not merely the
concretization of bourgeois economic desires, such as the need for
a healthy work force. Neither were they a palliative designed to
quell social discontent (as instrumentalists would argue); nor were
they based upon considerations of justice, rights, or legal rationalism
(the deontological liberal viewpoint). In brief, several factors
coalesced into a movement to achieve a particular piece of
legislation, whose purpose was to serve the divergent ends of
disparate social groups and factions. Once enacted, however, these
laws began, over time, to fulfill functions not foreseen in the

68 The term "constitutive" is simply another way of expressing my interactional theory of
law. The idea first emerges in Klare's excellent article, "Law-making as Praxis" (1979) 40
Telos 123 at 128; and later in Tushnet's "Marxism as Metaphor" (1983) 68 Cornell L.R. 281
at 285-87. For a favourable response, see Alan Hunt, "The Theory of Critical Legal Studies"

(1985) Oxford J. Leg. Stud. at 37-43, where he pithily comments, "law both constitutes and
is constituted." ]bid. at 38.
69 Hugh Collins, Marxism and Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982) at 46-47.
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circumstances of their creation: they contributed to the development
of the capitalist mode of production in so far as they provided for
the preservation of a healthy labour force, and helped the demise of
antiquated manufacturing industries which could only survive in
conditions of very cheap labour. With the benefit of hindsight we
can now realize that the acts were both reactive and proactive.
Similarly, in Britain during the Great Depression of the
1930s, there was widespread social discontent and demands for
government intervention. The logic of capitalism was to allow
capital to locate wherever it wished, but political realism, in response
to the threat to the established political and economic order,
overruled the logic of capital and the Special Area Acts were passed
in an attempt to create industry in depressed areas. To explain this,
law must be analyzed as a response to conflict of social groups.
These Acts were forced upon the ruling class by both the reality and
threat of widespread disorder. They cannot be passed off as an
ideological confidence trick because they did provide real benefits
which eased the hardships of a difficult era. Proactively, they aided
the preservation of capitalist social relations by defusing a crisis of
confidence, and further, provided the tentative 70origins of a new
social structure, the interventionist welfare state.
Similar conclusions emerge from an analysis of various
aspects of American law. Freedom of speech is eulogized by
American jurisprudence, and Americans in general, as a fundamental
right enshrined in the Constitution. Indeed, ethical liberalism counts
71
freedom of speech as a crucial aspect of a rational life plan.
However, an analysis of the history of this right demonstrates its
historical contingency, inefficacy and ideological power. Its historical
contingency is clear:

70 David Sugarman, ed., Legality, Ideolog and the State (Toronto: Academic Press, 1983).
71 See for example, John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap
Press of Harvard University Press, 1971); Ronald Dworkin, TakingRights Seriously (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977); Bruce Ackerman, SocialJustice and the Liberal State

(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980).
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the primary periods of stringent enforcement and enlargement of speech rights by
the courts in the 1930s corresponded to the periods in which popular movements
demanded such expansion.

The judges of the early and middle twentieth century America were
reluctant to provide freedom of speech rights. Rather, their
decisions to confer such rights were a legal response to very
powerful labour activity which had demanded such rights and had
gone so far as to threaten widespread disorder and challenge if their
claims were not met. The inefficacy of the right is demonstrated by
its absence with regard to communists and other dissident groups
such as the Black Panther movement. Finally, its ideological power
is evident in that once the right was conceded, many popular
grievances receded, dissent was undercut and popular support for
radicals ceased. The invocation of the rhetoric of freedom of
speech tends to develop a sanctity so powerful that it ignores the
inequalities of current social relations which, in effect, means that
only very few have a freedom of speech right which is effective. In
America freedom of speech is a formal legal reality but one which
only a few can effectively utilize. Access to the right arose out of
popular demands but it induces social consciousness into a false
sense of freedom.
Karl Klare's analysis of the Supreme Court's interpretation
of the Wagner Act73 provides further support for the analysis of law
as a constitutive human process. This Act was forced upon the
legislature by the very powerful activities of labour in the 1930s.
The Act had massive radical potential in that many of its provisions
could be interpreted in such a way as to strengthen the position of
labour vis-a-vis the employers. The Act was a response to social
conflict, a victory for labour. Yet this short-term victory proved to
be a long-term defeat, with the intervention of a third social force,
the judges of the American Supreme Court. They interpreted the
Act in such a limited manner that they deradicalized it completely,
turned it upside down (or for them, right side up) and used it as a
72

David Kairys, "Freedom of Speech" in The Politicsof Law: A ProgressiveCritique (New

York: Pantheon Books, 1982) 140 at 141.
73 "Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act, and the Origins of Modem Legal

Consciousness," (1978) 62 Minn. L Rev. 265; see also R.A. Cloward & F.F. Piven, Poor
People's Movements (New York. Pantheon Books, 1977) at c. 3.

1989]

Law's Centaur

means of integrating collective labour into the American social
order. The result was the cooption of labour leaders and the
institutionalization of collective bargaining.
Interactionalism also provides us with a fruitful interpretation
of the Canadian Constitution Act 1982 and the Canadian Charterof
Rights and Freedoms.74 The motivating force behind this initiative
was the unilateral action by Trudeau and the federal bureaucracy to
further reinforce their conception of the Canadian identity.
However, with provincial intervention the issue became the locus of
power in Canadian society. What ensued was a sordid bartering
and bargaining by the various social and political elites.75 This
ended in stalemate. With the intervention of the Supreme Court of
Canada, and its "bold statecraft based on questionable
jurisprudence,"76 the disputants returned to the bargaining table and
the result was a cabalistic compromise (at the expense of Quebec).
This was followed by popular intervention by women's groups, the
native peoples and the handicapped. Noticeably there was no
movement to obtain substantive economic rights.77 Further we can
ask where is the Charter and the Constitution going? For example,
does it only apply to the public realm or does it extend to the
private realm?
Clear statements have been made by the
Department of Justice stating that was only intended to apply to the
public realm but recently arguments have been made that might also
apply to the private realm. 78 Similarly the Charter itself has now

74 Canadian Charterof Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Ac4 1982, being
Schedule B of the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.

75 Martin, supra, note 9.
76 Peter Russell, "Bold Statecraft based on Questionable Jurisprudence" in Russell et al,
The Court and the Constitution (Kingston: Centre for Intergovernmental Relations, 1982) at

1.
77 Panitch & Schwartz, From Consent to Coercion (Toronto: Garamond Press, 1985) at
12.
78 Dale Gibson, "The Charter of Rights and The Private Sector" (1982) 12 Man. L. J.

213; Brian Slattery "Charter of Rights and Freedom - Does it Bind Private Persons?" (1985)
63 Can. Bar Rev. 148; John Whyte, "Is the Private Sector Affected by the Charter?" in R.
Elliot & L. Smith eds, Righting the Balance: Canada'sNew Equality Rights (Toronto: Carswell,
1985).
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become a socio-political battle ground in cases like Operation
Dismantle Inc. v. The Queen79 and Lavigne v. O.P.S.E.U.
The thesis that I am presenting demands that we look at the
prehistory of every piece of law; that we locate law in its social,
political, economic, moral and gendered contexts; that we look
closely at how it has been interpreted, applied, and developed; and
that we critically analyze its ultimate effect. We have to recognize
that it is we who make our own history and that law is both an
effect of, and contributor to, social relations. Law is a material
condensation of social relations in so far as it is an aspect of human
interaction where competing interpretations, attitudes, and visions
fuse, conflict, merge, coalesce and mutually modify each other and
then reemerge as either rules or in the guise of legal personnel (for
example, a judge, police officer or arbitrator) or through an
institution such as the courts. Law is one arena in which people
choose (or perhaps more commonly are forced to choose) to
attempt to fulfill their nature as social beings.
This is not, however, a pluralist analysis of law which
portrays law as a neutral arena which absorbs and digests all relative
viewpoints, evaluating them objectively and spitting out a decision or
announcing a role which its functionaries are to fulfill. Such an
approach incorporates a reified view of law. The relationships
involved are much more internal than this pluralist vision. The
people interacting are sentient people who are in different social
positions; some rich, some poor, some black, some white, some
female, some male, some religious, some areligious, some educated,
some uneducated, et cetera.
These people express their
interpretations, their desires, their fears and their visions through the
law. Law itself must therefore be studied in terms of classes and
class factions, political parties and political cliques, bureaucrats,
pluriclassite and cultural movements and all their corresponding
ideologies. Law is created by the interaction of all these social
forces, and in turn helps create the way in which these social forces
interact. Law is both created and creator. It is only by adopting

79 [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441.
80 (1986), 55 O.R. (2d) 449.
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this interactional approach that we can sufficiently comprehend the
contradictory reality of law. As Edward Thompson argues,
I found that law did not keep politely to a level but was at every bloody level; it
was imbricated within the mode of production and productive relations themselves
(as property rights, definitions of agrarian practice) and it was simultaneously
present in the philosophy of Locke; it intruded brusquely within alien categories,
reappearing bewigged and gowned in the guise of ideology; it danced cotillion with
religion, moralizing over the theatre at Tybur; it was an arm of politics, politics
was one of its arms; it was an academic discipline, subjected to the rigor of its own
autonomous logic; it contributed to the definition of the self-identity both of rulers
and ruled; above all it afforded an arena for class struggle, within which alternative
81
notions of law were fought out

The

values

inherent

in

law

cannot

be

viewed

as

transcendental, rising above factional partisanship. On the contrary,
law becomes another aspect of social relations where partisanship

expresses itself; law is not distinct from politics but integral to
politics.82 Law is incorrigibly subjective. Indeed, the manipulation
of legality is one of the most important techniques employed by the
capitalist state in its strategy of absorbing incipient conflict and
83
eradicating dissent in such a way as to preserve the status quo.
Law and politics are continually fused in law's ideological, facilitative
and violent roles. Within current social relations, law functions so

as to contribute to the creation of hegemony and simultaneously
attempts to monopolize the use of violence against dissent.
B.

Consequences of Interactionalism
Human kind cannot bear very much reality.

84
T.S. Eliot 8

81 Supra, note 28 at 288.
82 Joseph Singer, "The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory" (1984) 94
Yale Li. 1. For a refreshing confession on the indeterminacy of doctrine in the Canadian
context see S. Peck, 'The Developing Analytical Framework for Decision-Making Under the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms" (1987) 25 Osgoode Hall L.J. 1.
83 Maureen Cain, "Gramsci, The State and The Place of Law" in Sugarman, supra, note
70 at 95; and Mathieson, supra, note 33.
84 T.S. Eliot, Murder in the Cathedral(London: Faber and Faber, 1976) at 75.
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If we accept the interactional theory of law, then several
consequences automatically follow. First, the interactional theory of
law argues that law does not derive from principles such as justice
or rights but rather is a legal response to human interaction,
whether that be consensual or conflictual. Law must be analyzed in
terms of human relations, where people tend to structure their
relationships in accordance with certain rules and institutions.
However, these rules and institutions must not be perceived as
having some transcendental quality which takes them above and
beyond the relationships that create them. These rules do not have
some immutable essence but rather are human creations developed
out of situations of either consensus or conflict. The rules may
continue after the demise of their creators and thereby delineate the
life plans (styles) of other people, but that does not give them any
85
sanctity. This realization can have an important therapeutic value.
Once we recognize that rules have been created by people with
particular interests, it encourages (and begins to empower) us to
change those rules in accordance with our own particular interests.
Legal rules are an expression of individuals' subjective interests not
objective, rational standards by which to evaluate society. Legal
rules are the creation of social beings, and the liberal ideal of the
Rule of Law must therefore be rendered vulnerable to critical
appraisal.
The same can be said of legal institutions. They are the
creations of people who claim, or are attributed with, a legal title:
a judge, a lawyer, or a police officer. The institutions are a
composition of human beings who have an irrepressible social
context and thus have individual backgrounds, attitudes, values and
aspirations. In short, these institutions are peopled by human beings
who have inevitably subjective values. Contingency, indeterminacy,
relativism, and subjectivity are the manifestly unstable foundations of
legal rules and legal institutions.
Second, it was argued earlier that because the state must be
analyzed in terms of social relations its nature necessarily changes
with distinct historical phases and, therefore, there can be no
85 For an interesting attempt to relate psycho-analytic therapy to cognitive and political
emancipation, see Jurgen Habermas, Knzowledge and Human Interests (Boston: Beacon Press,
1971) at Part Ill.
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general theory of the state. An interactional theory of law reaches
the same conclusion. The nature and functions of law change with
the various historic-political conjunctures and the nature of social
relations 8 6 If we accept that there can be no general theory of law,
then our investigations must focus upon law's specific place and
function within the complex totality of social relations. A modem
analysis must therefore attempt to discover how law contributes to
the continued existence of modern capitalist social relations.
However, before returning to these questions, we must deal
with the third consequence of the interactional theory, that is, the
and politics. Put briefly they
relationship between law, 8economics
7
are relatively autonomous.
86 This may appear to be a rather banal observation but it is one that appears to be
unrecognized by both the traditional left and certain modern liberals. For example,
Pashukanis offered a general theory of law which portrayed all law as bourgeois law which
would ultimately wither away with the emergence of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The
General Theory of Law and Marxism (1924) in Beirne & Sharlet, eds, Pashukanis: Selected
Writings (Toronto: Academic Press, 1980). More recently, the Marxist Leninist jurist J.S.
Jawitsch has once again offered us a General Theory of Law (Moscow: Progress Publications,
1981). Within the liberal camp we find deontological idealism which, in effect, offers general
theories of law based upon transcendental, neo-Kantian imperatives of justice presumed to be
valid for all persons at all times. See for example, Rawls, supra; note 71.
Leading social theorists including Durkheim, Weber, and Marx, operating beyond
the confines of the self-inflicted myopia of traditional jurisprudence, support the thesis of the
historical contingency of law. Legal historians as diverse as Roberto Unger, Law and Modern
Society (New York: Free Press, 1976) and Frederick Hayek, Law Legislation and Liberty,
Volume I Rules and Orders (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973) reach a similar
conclusion. And anyone with even the vaguest smattering of awareness of legal history in
particular areas should be aware of this changing nature of law. With regards to contract, see
Morton Horowitz, The Transformation of American Law (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1973). With regards to criminal law, see Jerome Hall, Theft Law and
Society (Indianapolis: Bobbs Merrill, 1952).
87 Relative autonomy is, without doubt, one of the most popular phrases in modern
radical theory. Indeed it has become dangerously "trendy." The term can be traced as far
back as Engels, but its most modern adaption has been in the work of French structuralism
and, in particular, Louis Althusser. For structuralism relative autonomy is the way in which
various "regions" (to use Poulantzas' phrase) interrelate. As such it is used as the connecting
link between the "external blocks" of social forces. Each block interacts with the other block
and they modify each other. They do not determine but rather are of mutual (though not
necessarily co-equal) influence. The image created is that of a mathematical matrix.
Structuralism has been justly criticized for its coldness, externalism and negation of purposive
human action. However, I do find the term "relative autonomy" particularly felicitous since
it does capture the essence of relationships which are interactional and mutually
complementary. Therefore I propose to use the term in the sense slightly different from that
of the structuralists and adopt the view that the various economic, political and legal aspects
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The crude materialism (or economism) of traditional Marxism
is rejected in so far as it argues that economic relations determine
all other relations. Such determinism fails to comprehend the
complexity of human relations. The relationship between law and
economics, the legal and economic aspects of human relations, is
best perceived in terms of the economic providing the basic
trajectory of social relations within which the legal aspects take
place. Put differently, legal relations function, generally, within the
parameters set by economic relations. Within these limits law can
fulfill a number of roles: provision of consumer protection, minimum
wage and even welfare legislation. But as a rule, law must not
challenge the essentials of the economic conditions of post-industrial
society.88 Thus, law can have an important effect upon how
capitalist social relations continue, but cannot challenge the
fundamentals of economic relationships.
A specific example might help. Thomas Mathieson argues
that during the development of oil drilling in the Ekofisk area of
the North Sea, when the economic imperative was at its height in
response to the world oil crises between 1966-1975, worker
protection legislation was absent. Legal protection of workers
against accident and health hazards, which might affect efficiency
and the costs of research, only developed after economic necessities
had been fulfilled, and the economy had been secured. 89 This is not
an isolated incident, in so far as Mathieson argues for the
"precedence of materiality" throughout his second chapter and
provides numerous other examples in the areas of penal law,
financial law, children's protection law, forest protection law,

of social interaction all develop on their own dynamic but are integrally related each with the
other. Thus, one's legal activities are affected by one's political activities which are affected
by one's economic activities, and vice-versa.
(London: MacMillan, 1979).

See also Paul Hirst, On Law and Ideoloy

88 This argument necessarily casts a shadow over Unger's aspiration to develop a
"deviationist doctrine" in the area of contract law which will contribute to the transcendence
of our present impoverished-cum-alienated context. 'The Critical Legal Studies Movement"
(1983) 96 Harv. L. Rev. 561. See also Hugh Collins, The Law of Contract (London:

Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1986); and Brettel Dawson, "The Estoppel Anomaly in
Conventional Contract Doctrine" LL.M. Thesis, Osgoode Hall Law School, 1986.
89 Supra, note 33 at c. 2. See also W. Carson, The Other Price Of Britain's Oil (London:
Martin-Robinson, 1981).
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working environment law, and company law.90 Furthermore, law has
come to play an increasingly important role in the preservation of
capitalist social relations, as society moves further into the era of
late capitalism. 91 Of particular relevance here is the regulatory role
of law. Law can develop its own dynamic, protect rights, advance
social reform and even curb excessive exploitation and abuse, so
long as it does not challenge the fundamentals of capitalist economic
relations. The degree
of autonomy will depend upon the particulars
92
of the situation.
Legal relations are also relatively autonomous from political
relations. Contrary to the instrumentalist view, the political aspects
do not dictate to the legal aspects of human interaction how they
should develop; the political does not determine the legal. Each of
these aspects develops out of the interaction, conflict, compromise
and mutual adaptation of a variety of classes, social groups and subgroups on a variety of issues. An institution or a rule exists as it
does at a certain moment because of the relative strengths and
weaknesses of the various competing social groups. Thus, the state
and political relations may reflect the overall interests of one class
or class faction (limited of course by other groups) while law and
legal relations may reflect the overall interests of a different class or
class faction (again limited by other groups). Law and state are two
separate, though interconnected, regions where social conflict is
fought out. Thus, one need not necessarily be exactly the same as
the other. Indeed there may be even be trade offs between power
in one arena for power in the other. Therefore "the legal" can be
autonomous from "the political."
Legal autonomy derives from several sources. In part, it is
a manifestation of the nature of the legal profession itself which
claims to hold itself above political, economic or social calculation.
Secondly, the profession attempts to resolve problems within the

90 Ibid.
91 Poulantzas, supra; note 16; Habermas, supra, note 66 and Claus Offe, The

Contradictionsof the Welfare State (London: Hutchinson, 1984); L. Panitch & D. Schwartz,
supra, note 77 at c. 2.
92 This regulatory role of law being a fairly new phenomenon also reinforces my previous
argument with regards to the relativity and historical contingency of law.
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limitations of its academic and professional constraints. Thus, in
order to reach a decision, lawyers and judges rely on consistency,
ratio decidendi, et cetera. in order that the decision "fit" within the
relevant legal tradition.9 3 The autonomy also derives in part from
the fact that lawyers have their own professional material interests
at stake. They are part of the social conflict oriented towards the
attainment of material goods. For example, recently there has been
a conflict between the British legal profession and the Thatcher
Administration in which the latter successfully terminated the
former's monopoly on conveyancing. This material aspect (or jobs
for the boys) has also been suggested by Dickson when he argues
that the Marijuana Tax Act 1937 was pushed through in order to
provide work for a branch of the legal profession (used in a wide
sense); that is, the Narcotics Bureau, who were in danger of being
made redundant.94 Similarly, the wave of collective paranoia about
terrorism currently sweeping through most western states is providing
a lucrative source of employment for the security services, both
public and private.
Sometimes legal autonomy can become so strong that it can
effectively block "essential" political action. An excellent example of
this is the United States Supreme Court's resistance to the New
Deal legislation in the 1930s. In view of the major social discontent
kindled by the Depression, and the resultant sharp drops in income,
production and employment, the Federal Government legislated for
massive policies of social reform and assistance. This meant state
intervention into traditionally "private" economic relations. The
Federal Government claimed its capacity to do this in accordance
with the "Commerce Clause" of the American Constitution. Several
acts were passed by Congress and all were struck down by the
Supreme Court on the basis that it was federal interference in

For example, Karl Llewellyn in The Common Law Tradition (Boston: Little Brown,
1960) identifies some of the steadying factors operating upon judicial decision-making at the
appellate court level: the common training and experience of the judges; their adherence to

techniques of argument and legal analysis; the policy of group decision making; the use of
collective judicial values; and their mutual expectations. See also Ronald Dworkin, supra, note
11 for an extended spirited, but ultimately futile, defence of legal autonomy.
94 See Steinhert, "On The Functions Of Criminal Law" (1978) 3 Contemp. Crisis 197.
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spheres assigned to states by the Constitution.95 Political necessity
required this reformist legislation, but narrow judicial legislation
prohibited it. It does not matter whether the reason for this judicial
intransigence was the stated desire to maintain legal precedent or
whether it reflected the personal convictions of the judiciary that
state interventionism was unacceptable policy. The point is that
legal decisions effectively halted political policy essential to the
continuance of capitalist social relations. The judges
only complied
96
when Roosevelt threatened to "pack" the court.
This example also demonstrates that legal autonomy is not
absolute, but only relative. Ultimately, legal relations were brought
into line with political and economic necessity. But the "relativity"
goes deeper. As I have argued, the law is people in action; people
who have their own values, opinions, desires and visions as to how
society ought to develop. Legal personnel cannot act any more
objectively than their peers; they also incorporate their own
"political tilts" into their legal roles. In this way legal relations are
influenced by the competing political aspirations of various social
groups. Therefore the political is also inherent in the legal. A
different social group may dominate legal relations than that which
97
dominates political relations and this can lead to a conflict.
However, it is not surprising to find that, generally, the political and
legal aspects are in harmony in our current set of social relations,
indeed, perhaps in "teeth gritting" harmony. The explanation is not
difficult to find: often the people with the greatest influence in both

95 For example, Bituminous Coal Conservation Act (1935) 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 801-27, struck
down by Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); National Industrial Recovery Act
(1933) 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 701, struck down byA.L.A. Schechter Poulty Corp. v. United States, 295
U.S. 495 (1935). See also, Railroad Retirement Act (1934) 45 U.S.C.A. §§ 201-14, struck
down by RailroadRetirement Board v. Alton Railroad Co., 295 U.S. 330 (1935).
96

N.L.R.B. v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).

97 An interesting example of legal actors manifesting their autonomy from the political

elite in the Canadian context occurred during the prosecution of communists under s. 98 of
the CriminalCode. At a pretrial stage, Rose J. discovered a flaw in the construction of the

clause - there was an "and" where there should have been an 'or" - and indicated that the
evidence might not disclose a cause of action. Once again, however, the autonomy was shortlived for when the case came to trial, it was presided over by Wright J., who disregarded the
significance of such interpretive niceties. See RA Adams, 'The 1931 Arrest and Trial of the
Leaders of the C.P.C." Fredericton, N.B., 1977.
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these arenas are from similar backgrounds and have similar attitudes
towards how society should develop. 98 They share a common
This in itself provides an explanation of the
ideology.
appropriateness of developing the concept of 'Juridico-political,"
since in the current politico-historical conjuncture there 99are very
close connections between juridical and political relations.
With such an interpretation of relative autonomy it is
impossible to provide a general answer to the question: "How
autonomous is the law?"100 The answer will only become apparent
on a specific analysis of every act passed, every decision reached,
every rule enforced (or waived) and every conflict "resolved."10 1

Tushnet observes,
Thus we have to conceive of the legal order as relatively autonomous, responsive
directly to social and economic needs at some times with respect to some matters,
at other times on other matters, and not responsive at all in
responsive indirectly102
still other instances.

C.

The Functions of Law
We'll put a few union leaders in jail for three years and others will get the message.
o3
P.E. Trudeaul

98 See J. E. Hodgetts who argues in his study of the pre-Confederation Canadian
bureaucracy that the leading state personnel were mostly lawyers by profession. See Pioneer
Public Service (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1955) at 67. Things have not changed
all that much in over a century! However, lawyers may now be in the process of being
displaced by the emergence of a new technological and commercial elite. See, for example,
the composition of the Bourassa administration in Quebec. S. Brooks & A. Gagnon, Social
Scientists and Politics in Canada (Kingston: McGill-Queen's Press, 1988) c. 3.
99 Poulantzas, supra, note 8 at 45.
100 Cotterrell, supra, note 32 at 123, 141-45; and Hunt, supra, note 68 at 28-32 demand
such an answer.
101 One attempt to do this is Edelman's Ownership of the inage in relation to
photography and censorship law in France, supra, note 18. My ensuing discussion of violence
is another.
102 "Perspectives on the Development of American Law" (1977) Wisc. L. Rev. 81 at 84.
It is not surprising that exactly the same questions were raised and answered in the MilibardPoulantzas debate. See "Poulantzas and the Capitalist State" [1973] New Left Rev. 82 and
S.P.S., supra, note 16 at 72.
103 Cited in Panitch & Schwartz, supra, note 77 at 34.
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On the basis of this interactional theory of law it is now

possible to analyze some of the various functions which law fulfills
within the current politico-historical conjuncture 0 4 Mark Tushnet
and Karl Klare, drawing on the work of Gramsci and Althusser,
have provided a useful methodology in suggesting that law can be
analyzed in terms of its fulfillment of three functions:
the
facilitation of capitalist economic relations; the creation of a
dominant ideology; and the repression of dissent1 05 Despite some
weaknesses in their respective works, the Tushnet/Klare approach is
of great heuristic value and thus provides
a basic framework of
106
analysis for the remainder of this paper.

104 To discuss the functions of law is not necessarily to commit ourselves to Parsonian
functionalism which gives precedent to "the system" while ignoring "the untidy data of history
and the complexities of human motivation." Cotterrell, supra, note 32 at 98; see also Alan
Hunt, "The Ideology of Law" (1985) 19 Law & Soc'y Rev. 101. More specifically, my
preceding discussion of the alienation and contradictory consciousness of contemporary society
and my ensuing analysis of violence clearly demonstrate that functionalism is incompatible with
my thesis. I intend to use function in the widest sense possible - descriptively. This footnote
is for Leo Panitch.
105 Tushnet, supra, note 102; and Kare, supra, note 68. See also Panitch, supra, note
13 at 8-9; and James O'Connor, The Fiscal Crisis of the State (New York: St. Martin's Press,
1973) and who suggests three functions of the state more generally:
accumulation,
legitimation and coercion.
106 It must be emphasized at the outset that this approach of separating into categories
is artificial in that all law (social interaction) can be all of these at once ... and more!
Tushnet is aware of this to some extent when he argues that the ideological function
permeates all the others, but this is only a half/third truth. All law simultaneously fulfills all
three roles; to emphasize one is to run the risk of under-emphasizing the others. See for
example Robert Hale, "Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State" (1923)
38 Pol. Sci. Q. 470 which argues that facilitative law is highly coercive. There is a tendency
within modern Anglo-American critical legal theory (of which Tushnet's work is only an
example) to emphasize the ideological role of law in contradistinction to the Marxist-Leninist
emphasis on the repressive aspect of law. This is a move in the right direction, but comes
perilously close to going too far in that it often ignores both the extent of legal violence and,
more importantly, the close connection between legal ideology and legal violence. Another
problem with Tushnet's work is that although he emphasizes the ideological role of law, he
neither offers an interpretation of what ideology is nor does he relate the concepts of ideology
and hegemony. Perhaps most importantly, there is no attempt on the part of either Tushnet
or Kare to relate the various functions which law fulfills to each other. This is a crucial
aspect of my own argument. My criticisms of the Klare/Tushnet analysis are not negative;
rather they are intended to be positive in that I believe that they have moved in the right
(left) direction but have not gone far enough.
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It will be necessary for the military to kill some of the mob before the trouble can

be stayed. They have killed only six as yet. This is hardly enough to make an
impression.
Judge

Howard William
Taft1 0 8

Law, in its ideological role, contributes to the attempt to
achieve hegemony. Law attempts to affect people's lives in such a
way that they spontaneously consent to the current state of affairs.
Earlier the concept of ideology as false consciousness (that is,
instrumentalist theory applied to ideas) was rejected in favour of
ideology as lived relations, an analysis that presents ideology as
fulfilling a cohesive function, something which provides direction as
to how people are to interact with each other. The ensuing
discussion of the ideological role of law is informed by, and
reinforces, such a conception of ideology.
Law in modern society fulfills what may be called a
"directive" function in that it educates and adapts much of the

population to the goals of civil society. Its function, in this regard,
is to achieve an acceptable level of consensus, to create relative
stability in order that existing social relations might continue. Law
as ideology is formative. The ideological function of law is to
generate "spontaneous consent" and "the will to conform,"1°9 those

two attitudes which indicate that some class or class faction has
attained hegemony. Gramsci explicitly recognized this role in one of
his few passing references to law:
This problem contains in a nutshell the entire 'juridical" problem, that is, the
problem of assimilating the entire grouping into its most advanced fraction; it is the
problem of education of the masses, and their "adaption" in accordance with the

107 For an early, non-critical discussion of law's ideological function, see Thurman W.
Arnold, The Symbols of Government (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1935).

108 Judge William Howard Taft (later Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United
states) in a letter to his wife. Cited in Stuart Jamieson, Times of Trouble: Labour Unrest and
Industrial Conflict in Canada (Ottawa: Studies of the Task Force on Labour Relations, No.

22, 1968) at 65.
109 Gramsci, supra, note 30 at 195.
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goal to be achieved.
0
society.... 1 1

This is precisely the function of the law and state and in

Modern law plays a norm creating role which justifies modem social
this role by the dual movement of mystification
relations. It fulfills
111
legitimation.
and
a) Mystification
Ideologies are material practices in that, not only are they
created, but they also create social relations. A useful example is
employment relations. Law plays a crucial role in eclipsing the
exploitation of labourers in so far as the wage contract appears to
be the price of labour itself, that is, the price of the labour actually
performed. In effect law is doing two things here. First, it obscures
the fact that the employer sells the goods at a higher price than the
cost of labour plus the cost of materials; in other words, that the
employer makes a profit at the labourer's expense. Law therefore
misrepresents the fact that the labourer is getting less than the value
of her labour. Secondly, the wage contract assumes equality of
bargaining power, and thus ignores the dominating nature of the
employer/employee relationship, removing these actors from the
pertinent economic and political context. "The employment contract
appears in law as a consensual contract between equals, rather than
what it really is, an expression of the conflicting interests of parties
of unequal power."112 This legal interpretation of social relations is
not false consciousness; rather, it is the "real" relationship which is
widely accepted as the norm. The world relates to this accepted
interpretation as if it were the inevitable way of dealing with labour
relations. No other alternative can or will be contemplated. The
legal framework of rules, doctrines, and personnel achieves "a

110 Ibid.
111 Although I have split my discussion of the efficacy of law as ideology into two phases
as if they operate in temporal sequence, I wish to point out that this approach is only to
facilitate analysis and that, in effect, the ideological role of law is a simultaneous dual

movement striving to attain a hegemonic condition.
112 Alan Hunt, "Law, State and Class Struggle" (1976) 20 Marxism Today.
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comprehensive interpretation and evaluation of social relationships
and events" which are in accordance with the preservation of social
relations as currently constituted. Take, for example, the case of
dismissal from employment. In order to challenge a dismissal, a
person must first accept that it is a legitimate right of the owners of
capital to determine security of employment. The right can be
challenged, often successfully, but only on the basis of accepting it
as a right in the first place. This is not simply an abstract idea; it
is a way in which people interact with each other, a framework of
presuppositions upon which people build their relationships.
Let us stay in the arena of labour relations as this provides
a paradigm example of the power of "law as ideology" in glossing
over the class nature of current society. Karl Klare's analysis of the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the Wagner Act provides another
incisive account of the power of legal ideology. The justices'
structuring of the Act enabled them to interpret collective bargaining
in such a way as to integrate the trade union movement into
American social relations, thereby removing their radical potential
and, in effect, making them into a junior partner in the process of
reproducing capitalist social relations. "In shaping the nation's
labour law the Court embraced those aims of the act most consistent
with the assumptions of liberal capitalism, and foreclosed those
potential paths most threatening to the established order."1 13 Law,
through the institution of the Supreme Court, constructed social
relations in such a way that labour lost much of its potential as a
radical force. Collective bargaining and limitations on "legitimate"
trade union activity effectively meant state administration of the class
struggle.
Another example of legal personnel structuring social
relations in ways that redefine the basic nature of social interaction
is the American Public Defender System. It has been argued that
the purpose of this system is to "process" as many people as quickly
as possible through the courts in order to make the system operate

113 Beirne & Quinney eds, Marxsm and Law, (New York: Wiley, 1982) at 149. In the
Canadian context, see Panitch, supra, note 77 at 28-29 and footnotes therein.
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as efficiently as possible.1 14 The clients are rarely taken into
consideration and the relevant social and economic conditions are
ignored. Yet justice is said to prevail because everybody has the
benefit of legal representation. The law cultivates a sense of
acquiescence in its "victims," in so far as it decontextualizes their
crimes and induces them to believe that they have had a "fair deal."
The whole approach ignores the class relativity of crime controlJs
Further, if we look at Packer's two paradigm's of "crime control" and
"due process" we get the impression that due process is less
authoritarian than crime control.1 16 However, recent research on
the effects of the process model suggests that it is even more
11 7
controlling than the control model!
These brief examples demonstrate the efficacy of legal
ideology in reconstructing social relations. Greater rigor is required,
and the remainder of this section is oriented towards explaining just
how law can be so efficacious.
Once again the work of Nicolas Poulantzas is particularly
enlightening. He argues that, through the "effect of isolation,"
juridico-political relations have a crucial impact upon social relations
because they set up ("interpellate") the members of society as
individual juridical subjects, thereby depriving them of both their
economic position and class/group membership. There is no doubt
in Poulantzas' mind that it is law (legal ideology) which creates such
decontextualized relationships:
[t]he effect of isolation is the privileged product of juridico-political ideology ...

setting up "political" "individual persons," "subjects of law," who are "free" and

.114 R. Lefcourt, "Lawyers for the Poor Can't Win" in Lefcourt, ed., Law Against the

People (New York: Vintage Books, 1971) at 123-39.
115 Lefcourt goes on to argue that class conflict is defused and reduced to an

administrative process. This is obviously based on the assumption that crime is part of the
class struggle. This is a difficult question which goes beyond the scope of this paper. My own
argument, however, is narrower than that of Lefcourt in that I do not argue that crime is part
of the class struggle but rather that it is a vital arena of potential dissent that is deradicalized
by the power of legal ideology. Such an argument does not require a class reductionist

perspective.
116 The Limits of the CriminalSanction (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968).
117 Doreen McBarnett, Conviction: Law, The State and the Construction of Justice
Macmillan, 1981).

(London:
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"equal" one to the other, this allows the functioning of those juridico-political
structures which permit the labour contract ... capitalist private property ... the

generalization of exchange, competition, et cetera.... [Tihis effect of isolation is the
very basis which masks from the agent the real structures of the economic
1 its
dominance in the [capitalist mode of production], class structure, et cetera.... 18

Therefore economic actors do not experience capitalist relations as
class relations but as relations of competition amongst the mutually
isolated individuals and/or fragmented groups of workers and
capitalists. As we shall see in a moment, the ideological role of law
does not stop here but119simultaneously operates to achieve "a
remarkable socialization."
Poulantzas develops a similar argument with respect to the
political aspect of human interaction. Law, through constitutions,
legislation, judicial decisions, court procedures, and the various
institutions, operates as if it were in a world where every person is
perfectly free and perfectly equal. Institutions are established on
the basis of the universality of equal individualism, for example,
Parliament and the right to vote. Every person is given equal rights
and equality before the law. What is ignored, however, is whether
these persons can ever have an opportunity to effectively exercise
these rights, or the reason why certain people are in court at all.
On the political level, since we all have a say in how our society is
run, the law has come to play a major role in the shaping of social
relations because, by operating on the principle of equal
individuality, it simply denies or obfuscates the extent of deprivation,
inequality, exploitation and mutual antagonism which is inherent in
capitalist social relations.1 2 0 Legal ideology has been so effective
that it becomes almost impossible to adopt an alternative vision of
social relations, so that what we have now appears to be natural, or
at least inevitable.

118 P.P.S.C, supra, note 8 at 213-14.
119 IbiaL at 278.
120 In many ways Poulantzas argument echoes Marx's critique of liberalism in On The
Jewish Question. See T.B. Bottomore, ed., KarlMax Early Writings (London: C.A. Watts and
Co. Ltd., 1963) at 10.
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b) Legitimation
This is the second aspect of legal ideology's dual movement,
the complement to mystification.
Within the Poulantzian analysis the vital counterpart to "the
effect of isolation" is the "effect of unification;" one cannot be
perceived without the other, they are two sides of the one coin. In
the earlier discussion of the state as a factor of cohesion it was
argued that one of the state's manifest purposes was to maintain the
political disorganization of the non-power bloc social groups. The
process of "social atomization," as outlined above, explains how this
is achieved. But simultaneously this is complemented by the
"unifying effect" which, in order to avoid anomie, presents the state
as a unity of these estranged monads in the form of the sovereign
people/nation. Unification takes root in, and develops out of, a
vision of isolation:
The specialization and centralization of the capitalist state, its hierarchical
bureaucratic functioning and its elective institutions all involve the atomization of
the body-politic into what are called individuals, that is, juridical political persons
who are subjects of certain freedoms. The centralized bureaucratized state installs
this atomization, and as a representative state laying claim to national sovereignty
and popular will, it represents the unity of a body that is split into formally
equivalent monads. The materiality of the state and its apparatuses is here
constituted as having to exercise a hold over a divided social body, one which is

homogenous in its division,
uniform in the isolation of its elements, and continuous
21
in its atomization.

Thus, organic, communitarian and constitutive social relations are
replaced by politico-ideological artifacts commonly contained within
the term "state." The "effect of unification" presents itself as a
strictly political (that is, non-economic) public unity of the people/
nation considered as an abstract sum of recollectivized, formally free
and equal subjects. In other words, the capitalist state sets itself up
as a unifying element among the individuals, the foundation which
holds society together. It derives its legitimacy from its claim to be
a "neutral arbitrator." The capitalist state becomes the people/
nation which, through institutions such as representative democracy,

121 S.P.S., supra, note 16 at 63.
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cements everything together. The state appears to be the neutral
subject above and beyond the social conflict:
... in this way the capitalist state constantly appears as a strictly political unity of
the economic struggle which is a sign of this isolation.

It presents itself as the

representative of the "general interest" of competing divergent economic interests
which conceal the class character from the agents who experience them.... [I]t
systematically conceals its political class character at the level of its political

institutions
... it presents itself as the incarnation of the popular will of the people
1 22
nation.

It is juridical ideology which effects this dual movement; the
juridical representation of the state as a source of unity in the midst
of isolation is directly related to the isolation for which it is itself
responsible. Law has become a major ideological force in capitalist
social relations because through law the capitalist state is presented
as embodying the general interests of the whole society. For
example, the CanadianCharterof Rights and Freedoms trumpets the
populist ideal of being "made in Canada, by Canadians, for
Canadians" when in fact it was no more than the product of power
struggle between various political and economic elites.
In turn, law's own role in society is reinforced because,
the state's unity is found ... in the modern juridical system: the specific normative
ensemble made up of legal subjects modelled according to the image of the citizen,

presents a systematic unity of the highest degree, in that it regulates the unity of
these subjects by means of laws.123

Law itself, in terms of institutions and personnel, has a specific role
in the current system of social relations, since it is particularly suited
to such formal rational inter-relations.1 24 Law fulfills the role of
creator of cohesion amongst antagonistic social relations, an
antagonism for which it is at least partially responsible. Law is
eulogized as the great civilizing force in society, without which
society could not exist. Law is counterposed to barbarism, violence
and terrorism. Not only is this fetishistic and narcissistic, it makes it
impossible for us to conceive of a society without law. Thus the
122 P.P.S.C, supra, note 8 at 130.

123 Ibid at 278.
124 David Trubek, "Max Weber on Law and the Rise of Capitalism" [1972] Wisc. L.
Rev. 720.
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world is turned upside-down. Law is presented as the creator of
it is people who create
society, when the reverse is more accurate;
1 25
law to regulate their own social relations
More examples illustrate such a claim. The dominance of
juridico-political ideology is so pervasive that even during periods of
crisis, when there is widespread dissatisfaction with the current
nature of social relations, oppressed groups often challenge authority
within the parameters permitted by law. Civil disobedients appeal
to concepts such as justice and rights; they limit their actions to
"constitutional dissent," non-violent protests, long marches, et cetera.
They operate within the confines of legitimacy outlined by those
who effectively dominate social relations. As civil disobedients, they
accept as legitimate the punishments inflicted upon them by the
police and judiciary.12 6 They play the game within the rules set by
their manifestly stronger opponents. In doing so, they may gain
some victories, even real victories, but the rules are tilted in such a
way they can never threaten the essentials of contemporary social
relations. If the rules do provide a threat, then they will be
changed.1 27 In short, such is law's capacity to act as social cement
and control social discourse, that most people live their revolt within
the bounds of juridico-political ideology.
It is possible to be more specific in analyzing the ways in
which law legitimates oppression, discrimination and violence.
Douglas Hay1 28 argues that law assumed pre-eminence in the course
of the eighteenth century, replacing religion as the dominant
ideology, and contributing to the hegemony of the bourgeoisie.

125 Chief Justice Dickson has recently provided us with a classic example of reification
and reiteration of the old shibboleths in "I'he Rule of Law: Judicial Independence and the
Separation of Powers" (Address to the Canadian Bar Association, Dalhousie University,
August 1985).
126 Rex Martin, "Civil Disobedience" (1970) 80 Ethics 123.
127 For example, see the response of the British government when constituents of

Fermanagh-South Tyrone chose the hunger striker Bobby Sands as their Member of
Parliament. Between his election and his death three weeks later the rules with regard to the

eligibility to be an M.P. were changed as to prevent other "convicted terrorists" from
representing the electorate.
128 "Property, Authority and the Criminal Law" in D. Hay, ed., Albions Fatal Tree (New

York: Pantheon Books, 1975) at 3.
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Through a subtle mixture of justice, majesty and mercy, law carried
out a crucial ideological role by "encouraging" a respect for property
owners. The majesty of law addressed the public by providing both
moral leadership and guidelines as to how people ought to behave.
This is an excellent example of "direction," a crucial link in the
attainment of hegemony. The appeal to justice was not quite so
successful, but the attempt was made so that not only was it
sometimes done, but it was also seen to be done. The example
which Hay provides is the "carnival" execution of Lord Ferrers in an
attempt to bolster the people's belief in the impartiality of law.
Finally, mercy proved to be a powerful device in the gaining of
popular loyalty since it encouraged deference, obedience and
gratitude on the part of the masses and thus reinforced the "bond
of obligation." Thus, for Hay, law is not only an instrument of
authority, but also a "breeder of values," playing a crucial role in
organizing the social fabric.
A further example of how law influences social attitudes and
takes on the role of moral guidance can be found in an analysis of
the effects of the United States Supreme Court's decisions on
discrimination against Blacks. David Freeman argues that,
as surely as the law has outlawed racial discrimination, it has affirmed that black
Americans can be without jobs, have their children in all black poorly funded
schools, have no opportunities for decent housing, and have very little political
12 9
power, without any violation of anti-discrimination law.

The law, through the institution of the Supreme Court, provides an
evolving statement of acceptable public morality. Supreme Court
decisions do prohibit certain activities that are discriminatory, but
what they do not prohibit becomes, in the popular perception, not
just legal, but morally, acceptable. Law is outlining acceptable levels
of discrimination and, as such, it tacitly legitimates such oppression.
"The law is a denial of our collective experience of illegitimacy ...
the function of law is legitimation."1 30 The law often pacifies any
sense (contradictory consciousness) we might have that current social
129 D.A. Freeman, "Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Anti-discrimination Law"
(1977-1978) 62 Minn. L. Rev. 1049.
130 P. Gabel, "Reification and Legal Reasoning" (1980) 3 Res. L. & Soc. 25. But see,
A. Hyde, 'qhe Concept of Legitimation in the Sociology of Law" [1983] Wisc. L. Rev. 379.
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relations are not quite as acceptable as the law (and other
ideological forces) 131 would have us believe.
The close connection, indeed identification, of legality and
legitimacy is particularly relevant in the sphere of criminal law.
Criminal law not only decontextualizes, it also dehumanizes; criminal
labels lead to a rejection and reification of persons, insidiously
undermining our solidarity and common humanity so that
punishment is generally perceived as legitimate. This is a point I
shall return to later. All I wish to suggest here is that the violent
aspects of law, such as arrest, interrogation and imprisonment, are
closely connected with ideology and legitimacy.
To conclude, it is clear that law as ideology is a crucial
method by which the hegemonic condition is sought; legal ideology
is a leading factor of cohesion in the present politico-historical
conjuncture. However, it is important to avoid over-emphasizing the
role of ideology; it is only one of at least three functions which
modern law fulfills. This is a danger to which E. P. Thompson may
have succumbed. He argues, correctly in my opinion, that in order
to attain legitimacy, the promises which law makes must themselves
be (partially) fulfilled. Ideology is not falsehood; rather it is an
attainer of social support and consensus, and as such it must live up
to its promises. However, Thompson goes on to argue that,
the rulers are inhibited by their own rules of law against the exercise of direct
unmediated
force (arbitrary imprisonment, employment of troops against a crowd,
13 2

torture...).

His argument is in danger of ignoring realpolitik. Ideology is
mediated by the other functions of law (facilitative and repressive)
and the law must always be, first and foremost, oriented toward the
131 This is an important point. This paper concentrates on law as performing a crucial
ideological role within current social relations. But it is not the only ideologue. Of particular

importance are education and the media which, in many ways, may be more influential than
law in creating a popular weltanschauung. There also vital links between these various
ideological forces: for example, the image of law and legal personnel presented in the media

(see Stuart Hall, Policing dtie Crisis (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1978)); and the respect
for law and order which is inculcated through the educational process. It is also suggested

that a strong argument could be made that law is rapidly losing its position of ideological
pre-eminence to technocratic terms which are considered even less personal/subjective than
law, and more compelling in a post-industrialist society.

132 Supra, note 28 at 265.
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maintenance of social order. The ideological restraints and
limitations on the abuse of power are contingent upon the level of
cohesion within society and, as such, have never provided an
effective barrier against legal violence.
2. The Facilitative Role of Law
A second manner in which law contributes in a vital way to
the maintenance and continuation of capitalist social relations can be
characterized as facilitative. In one sense, all law which fulfills a
cohesive function can be said to be facilitative, in that by smoothing
out contradictions it makes the continuation of modern society
easier. Facilitative, in the sense used here, is narrower because it
deals with those aspects of legal relations which relate more directly
to the economic side of human interactions.
For example,
facilitative laws are those such as property law, company law, trusts,
1 33

et cetera.

The discussion of this function of law will be brief since,
although it is voluminous and accounts for the vast majority of legal
activity (and thus provides employment for lawyers and judges), its
relevance to this article can be dealt with quickly. The facilitative
role of law, like the ideological role, is oriented towards the
attainment of a hegemonic condition. It can be characterized as:
A set of rules which organizes capitalist exchange and provides
13 4 a real framework

of cohesion in which commercial encounters can take place.

Law in this sense is fulfilling the role which Gramsci describes as
"organizer," it keeps things moving. As such, within the ruling
power bloc and the various alliances, law irons out conflict in the
best interests of the bloc as a whole. Although this may mean that
133 It is crucial to bear in mind, however, that the categorization is somewhat arbitrary,
and that it is possible to consider this facilitative function as a subfunction of the ideological
role of law, if ideology is taken to express itself in material forms through social relations, as
I have argued. The reason for dealing with facilitative law as a distinct category is that its
origins lie in, and have greatest impact upon, relations between various factions of the
bourgeoisie. Essentially, facilitative law is intraclass although, due to the pervasiveness of law,
it also has important effects on interclass relations.
134 P.P.S.C, supra, note 16 at 53.
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certain individuals or factions may suffer disadvantage, in the long
run it maintains the unity of the dominant social groups. 35 Law
prevents the inherent conflicts between the different bourgeois
factions from becoming so great that the parties competing for what
might be called the "hegemonic woolsack"l threaten the relative
stability of the social whole.
Property law provides a useful example of facilitative law.
Not only is it based upon the inequality of modern society, it also
reinforces that inequality in so far as it allows the owners of
property to use their property as capital. The complex of legal rules
relating to mortgages, leases, trusts, et cetera, all function to enable
the property to be used as capital. Company law and commercial
law exist solely to give effect to the mechanisms and needs of the
market, as modified by state intervention.
Contract law requires more extended analysis. Contract law
was an integral part of, and is essential to, the (continued)
development of the capitalist social formation, because business
persons require(d) a predictable form of social interaction on which
to create profits. 1 36
To regulate human interaction through
contractual agreement appears to be both natural, and more
importantly, efficacious. Contract law is a human creation, which
provides a framework for the massive and complex interrelations of
modern society. Although its origins lie in bourgeois interaction, its
utility has been so great that it has spread from intraclass relations
to interclass relations. It is accurate to claim that modern society
would not exist, at least as we now know it, without contract law.
Such an argument also reinforces the close relationships between
facilitative and ideological roles of law. Contract law fulfills a vital
ideological role in that it portrays (interpellates) all the participants

135 This also points to the close connection between the facilitative role of law and its
repressive role. The sanctions of law are essential to the facilitative role in that maverick
bourgeoisie, or even traditional bourgeoisie, can be brought into line. The sanctions are
required to curb the maverick who may take too many risks which threaten social stability and
to bring the traditional into line with contemporary economic imperatives.
136 This is not a deterministic interpretation, since my suggestion is that the regulation
of economic interaction through legal relations is an example of humankind making its own
history.
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as "free and equal" actors while simultaneously ignoring the
oppressive and inherently unequal nature of the market.
Although facilitative law plays an essential role in stabilizing
the inherent disequilibrium of a power bloc's interrelations, it
simultaneously runs the risk of exacerbating social antagonisms.
When the legal aspects of human inter-relations are applied to
economic problems, then those legal relations will be operating to
the advantage of a particular class or class fraction, which risks the
legitimacy of law in the eyes of those who are disadvantaged. 37 As
Western societies have moved further into late capitalism, which
requires greater intervention of state apparatuses into all aspects of
social life, the neutrality which law has claimed for itself becomes
increasingly fragile. When legal methods of regulating social
interaction are adopted to regulate economic relations, the
contingency of law becomes obvious. Facilitative law, in attempting
to fulfil its cohesive function, risks the legitimizing aspects of law
and so also takes on a destabilizing role. Social consensus is shaken,
and hegemony becomes that much more elusive. Poulantzas has
argued that the increased economic role of the state apparatuses has
created a crisis for the state (a crisis of legitimacy); that it has
entailed a change in the very nature of the state, from "normal" to
"authoritarian statism." He may overstate his case, but the basic
thrust of his argument is undoubtedly correct: that the ideological
and facilitative roles are inadequate to achieve complete hegemony
for the dominant social faction. The contradictions are too great.
The need to reproduce exploitation, domination and oppression
always leads to dissent, and law is one of the crucial arenas through
which dissent must be controlled. Social order must be maintained,
and this is achieved, in part, by recourse to legal violence.

137 An early example of this in the Canadian context was the nationalization of private
power companies by the Conservative government of Ontario at the beginning of this century,
thereby favouring one capitalist faction at the expense of another in order to create a
rationalized power grid system as part of the industrial infrastructure. Reg Whittaker, "Images
of the State in Canada" in Panitch, supra, note 13 at 54; and V. Nelles, The Politics of

Development (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974).
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3. The Violent Role of Law

269

38

Both Klare and Tushnet categorize the third function of law
as repressive. Although this serves as a useful guide, it is too wide

and too abstract to be of heuristic value for this aspect of legal
relations.

A more precise analysis can be developed on the basis

of the term violence, in the sense of physical injury or harm
138

39

To talk about violence is to open a veritable Pandora's Box. As Hobsbawm suggests,

"Of all the vague words of the the late 1960s, violence is very nearly the trendiest and most
E. Hobsbawm,
meaningless.
Everybody talks about it; nobody thinks about it."
Revolutionaries: The Rules of Violence (London: Weidenfield and Nicholoson, 1973) at 209.
There is no single correct defintion of violence. It is a term which is defined differently by
different political actors, and sometimes differently by the same political actors, depending
upon their aims, the context, and most importantly, their relations with established political
authority. The alternative interpretations of violence generally correlate with alternative
political philosophies and ideologies.
The dominant ideology of modem society, liberalism, has been particularly successful
in keeping violence unidimensional; that is, most people have a narrow perception of what
can be considered violent. The popular interpretation of violence is blinkered in that most
people believe violence is perpetrated only by criminals, deviants, and rebels, and never by
state-sanctioned personnel, except as an aberration. Language plays a vital role in developing
and supporting ideology. What Marcuse says about one-dimensional language applies perfectly
to the word "violence":
The word becomes a clichd, and as a clichd governs speech or writing; the
communication thus precludes genuine development of meaning.... [Tihe noun
governs the sentence in an authoritarian and totalitarian fashion, and the sentence
becomes a declaration to be accepted - it repels demonstration, qualification,
negation of its codified meaning.... [T]his language which constantly imposes images
militates against the development and expression of concepts. In its immediacy and
directness it impedes conceptual thinking, thus it impedes thinking.
One DimensionalMan, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1964) at 184.
139 Following on from the work of Weinstein & Grundy, The Ideologies of Violence
(Ohio: Merril Publishing, 1974), I suggest that the competing interpretations of violence can
be arranged on a conceptual and political continuum from narrow to broad as follows:
Narrow: Those uses of physical force which are prohibited by the normative order
presumed to be legitimate;
Intermediate: Any use of physical force;
Broad. All deprivations or violations of asserted human rights.
See also Charles Tilley, From Mobilizationto Revolution (Reading, Mass: AddisonWesley, 1978).
The narrow interpretation is the one which is usually put forward by those who
support current social relations, whether they be liberal or conservative. Its distinctive
characteristic is the juxtaposition of law and violence, "The binary opposite of violence is not
peace, love or restitution; it is the Law." S. Hall, supra note 131 at 302. This position has
been held by such diverse people as John Hobbes; John Dewey, "Force, Violence and
Coercion" 26 Int'l J. of Ethics at 35; Leslie McFarlane, Violence and the State (London:
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Nelson, 1974); and Ruben Gotesky "Social Force, Social Power and Social Violence" in S.S.
Stange, ed., Reason and Violence (Totowa, NJ.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1975) at 45. These
arguments share two common assumptions. Firstly, they portray violence as an aberration,
an unexpected interruption in the normal consensual course of events. Secondly, they
interpret violence as the illegal use of force, thereby allowing the defender of established
institutions to claim that use of force by state-sanctioned officials is justified and legitimate,
while the use of force by others is unjustified and illegitimate.
This approach has several inherent weaknesses. First, such claims are assertions
which, for their validity, depend on the narrowness of the interpretation. Second, as Marcuse
has argued, to claim that violence is by definition wrong is an example of political (and hence
evaluative) linguistics, utilized as a weapon by established society; it is a mere question begging
equivocation which fails to provide an understanding of violence. (New York Times Magazine,
October 23, 1968, at 90). Third, in liberal democratic society there is a tendency to perceive
legality and legitimacy as synonymous. The narrow approach adopts this tendency to its own
advantage since it avoids the problem of the validity of the counter-positioning of law and
violence, doing so simply by definition. This is inadequate, because law itself cannot presume
to be sacrosanct; law too is part of social relations and as such must be both analyzed and
critically evaluated. Finally, the approach manifests a non-too-subtle legerdemain, for it
intentionally confuses the question of what violence is, with the very different question of
whether the state and legal authorities ought to have a monopoly on the use of violence. This
approach is therefore vitiated by a litany of weaknesses. Worse still, it smacks of superficiality
and dishonesty which, as part of the dominant ideology, turns out to be a very successful
attempt at the deliberate construction of social myopia.
At the other end of the continuum is the broad approach, the radical critique, the
analysis which would, at first blush, appear to correlate with the tone of my argument. There
are two variations of this radical conception of violence, which are mutually complementary.
The first variation emphasizes the violational aspects of violence: violence is anything which
violates asserted human rights or dignity. This is an "expansive and ethical interpretation"
(Grundy and Weinstein, at 9) which in emphasizing the violation of human dignity, expands
the term to its widest reaches, subsuming a number of acts and conditions deemed immoral,
and heretofore not regarded as violence. See, for example, Ted Honderich, Violence for
Equality (London: Penguin, 1980); Newton Garver, "What Violence Is" (The Nation, June
24th 1968 at 817-22); and Martin Luther King's famous aphorism, "Poverty is Violence." The
basic thrust of this argument is that the very structure of modem Western society is so
unequal, patriarchical, discriminatory, racist, etc. that it violates human dignity and is therefore
violent. The second variation is not quite so expansive. It also refers to the nature of modern
society, but refers to death and injuries which result from everyday work or travel; violence
is associated with the excesses inherent in the capitalist mode of production. This is basically
a Marxist interpretation of violence. John Harris, "The Marxist Conception of Violence"
[1973-1976] Philosophy and Public Affairs 192. Despite the attractiveness of the arguments
involved here, I have decided for strategic and practical reasons not to adopt this approach.
My argument can be made on much narrower grounds.
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That law fulfills this role is not simply a description of the law in
action, but rather, it is an imperative of legal activity within
contemporary society.
There are several reasons why it is vital to emphasize the
violent aspect of law. First, it is important that we be honest with
ourselves, that we realize that violence can be used by any person
or group within society; by both those who defend existing social
relations, and those who challenge them. Second, it is important to
make clear that when legal personnel, in particular the police, do
use violence, often it is not' merely individual excess, the
"unfortunate" act carried out in the heat of the moment. Violence
is endemic to the legal relations of modern society. Third, violence
is prima facie immoral; it is wrong to physically injure or immobilize
another person.
Any analysis of the functions of modern law must be
underpinned by a sense of political realism. Existing society seeks
to preserve itself in its established, known form; those groups who
benefit from a particular configuration of social relations strive to
preserve that situation. The State, as a material condensation of

The intermediary approach can be designated as an "observational" (Grundy &
Weinstein, ibid. at 9) interpretation of violence because it is rooted in the observable act of
the infliction of physical harm, and does not distinguish between the source or the purpose
of such act. It looks to the victim. It refuses to take into consideration the questions of
legitimacy and illegitimacy, and is therefore less evaluative than the narrower approach; it
concentrates on the physical and thus is less comprehensive than the broad approach. 'The
essence of violence is that physical power is deliberately employed with the ultimate sanction
of physical pain and little choice is left but to surrender or physically resist." Gerald
Priestland, The Future of Violence (London: Hamilton, 1974) at 19. The interpretation is
precise enough to exclude the contingent connotations of legitimacy or illegitimacy yet include
the prima facie objection that it is wrong to violate another person's autonomy. The question
as to whether an act of violence is legitimate or not will depend therefore upon all the
relevant circumstances and not merely the identity of the actors. Admittedly, this approach
ignores psychological violence. However, it is useful in that it is much narrower than either
of the amorphous terms "coercion" or "repression." Therefore, for the purposes of this paper,
the interpretation to be adopted is that which is essentially observational, confining myself to
archetypical physical violence, that is, acts of violence. "The root concept of violence is that
of physical or quasi-physical injury, harm or suffering on someone against his or her will."
Anthony Alabaster, "What Violence Is" [19761 The Socialist Register at 223. Therefore,
decisions (which are also acts) which permit or instruct, or acts which result in the killing of
a person, the wounding of a person, the physical torture of a person, the striking of a person,
or the physical constraining of a person, all qualify as acts of violence. The focus is on the
victim and not the character of the perpetrator. Legal violence is no less violent for its being
legal.
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social relations, also functions to preserve the status quo; specifically,
through its cohesive role. But the contradictions are too great, and
since modern society is in continual flux, forces desiring social
change continually emerge.
When radical demands become
threatening to the status quo, "accommodation" is replaced by
coercion. Law is a vital part of these social relations. Through its
ideological and facilitative roles, it strives to attain the hegemonic
condition.
However, "contradictory consciousness" has always
developed, awareness of exploitation, domination and inequality
break through, and consensus weakens.
There may be a widespread respect for the Rule of Law in
Western liberal-democratic society, but at the same time there is
often dissent which manifests itself as a challenge to social stability.
Though not necessarily oriented towards a revolutionary change in
social relations, dissent does pose a threat to the social order. Law
plays a crucial role in terminating this threat. "The legal system is
140
first and foremost a means of exercising political control."
Let us take, for example, Isaac Balbus' empirical study of the
response of legal institutions to the Black riots of the late 1960s in
the United States. He argues that there were three major
influences operating on legal personnel at the time: the desire to
maintain law and order; the desire to maintain the legitimacy of law
and thus popular respect (and deference); and the desire to keep
the system functioning. When the riots began, the latter two
desiderata went into abeyance and the imperative for the police and
courts focused on stopping the riots and ending the "revolts."
Precedence was given to maintaining current social relations; once
the territory had been secured and the danger stopped, the tasks of
legitimation and administration could recommence. But first and
1 41
foremost the role of law was to preserve order.
This "imperative of the preservation of stability," as it might
be called, is not a novel role which "authoritarian statist law" has
taken on, as some commentators have suggested. Rather, it is an

140 Colin Sumner, Reading Ideologies (Toronto: Academic Press, 1979) at 277.
141 The Dialecticsof Legal Repression (New York: Russell Sage, 1973) at c. 5. Chambliss
and Seidman, Law, Order and Power, 2d ed. (Don Mills: Addison Wesley, 1982) offer similar
analyses of many other aspects of American law.
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endemic feature of modern law. Even a brief review of modern
legal history provides ample evidence.
Legal violence was closely related to the instability of social
relations in England between 1815 and 1848. First, there was
breakdown of social relations in the agricultural counties of the
Southeast due to the casualization of the agricultural proletariat.
The instability which this caused led to an increase in both
pauperism and crime, greater use of the Vagrancy Acts and the
Swing Riots of 1830. Second, London was an arena of major social
conflict. The initial legal response to the anti-Corn Law Riots of
1815, the Spa Field disturbances of 1816 and the riots attendant
upon Queen Caroline's trial was to terminate them all via the local
constabulary. This proved unsuccessful. Recourse was then had to
more efficient violence - the soldiery - who clumsily, brutally, but
successfully, brought the situation "under control." The resort to
military violence both risked and damaged the legitimacy of the
ruling classes, but there was no alternative if existing social relations
were to be preserved. Third, there was widespread dissent in the
new northern industrial towns, where regional labour markets (which
were tied to single industries) were vulnerable to cycles of demand
in the international market. When the spectre of the breakdown of
social order raised its head, the legal response was always the
imperative of restoring stability. This was achieved through the
violent control of riots, the killing of dissenters by the military, or
mass imprisonment. In the longer term, there developed a more
effective (and legitimate) response, with capacity for equivalent legal
violence: the creation of a Metropolitan Police Force in 1829 by
Robert Peel and the subsequent diffusion of paid constabularies
throughout the agricultural counties and industrial towns. There was
never any attempt made by the law to understand or resolve the
problems which caused the social disorder in the first place. The
immediate focus of legal intervention has always been "the social
142
order problem.
This analysis can be expanded to the whole of nineteenth
and early twentieth century Britain:

142 M. Ignatieff, A Just Measure of Pain (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978) at c. 6.
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At every crucial turning point - the struggle against the unreformed parliament, the
formation of the unions, the disturbances of the 1820s, the Chartist agitation, the

great popular reform demonstrations of the 1860s, the unemployment agitations of
the 1880s, the unrest accompanying the new unionism at the end of the 1890s and
the high-tide of militancy just before and after the first world war - the law played
the crucial role of preserving social order and valiantly putting down any effective
43
challenge to social relations.

The massive increase in State sanctioned violence under the current
Thatcher administration need not be discussed in this paper except
to point out that over 20,000 people were arrested, several pickets
were killed and many more injured during the course of the miners'
strike.144 English history demonstrates that legal institutions, rules,
and personnel were, and are, oriented towards the preservation of
the status quo.
A remarkably similar analysis can be made of American legal
history. Even from its earliest days, American law has staunchly
opposed dissident and non-conformist persons or groups. American
law has sanctioned violence in two ways: directly, through legal
personnel, and indirectly by "turning a blind eye" to extensive
violence against certain groups. For example, pacifist Quakers had
their services banned and were often imprisoned while those who
subjected them to mob violence were not punished. Rather such
actions were either ignored or acquiesced in. 145 Law failed to take
any action against those who murdered John Smith and other
Mormons. Irish Catholics, in view of their nationality, religion and
immigrant status, were often prosecuted for vagrancy or breach of
the peace - at least until they worked their way into the American
legal hierarchy. The courts rigidly enforced the statutes which

143 Stuart Hall, supra, note 131 at 193.

144 See for example, Phil Scratton, The State of the Police (London: Pluto, 1985); Roger
Geary, Policing IndustrialDisputes (1893 - 1985) (New York: Cambridge University Press,
1985); Robert Millar & Bob Fine eds, Policingthe Miners' Strike (London: Cobden Trust,
1984). See also C. Whelan, The Law and the Use of Troops in Industrial Disputes (Oxford:

Centre for Socio-legal Studies, 1979); B Fryer, ed., Law, State and Society (London: Croom
Helm, 1981) at 160; and K. Jeffery & P. Hennessy, States of Emergency: British Governments
and Strike-breaking Since 1919 (Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983).
145 Chambliss & Seidman, supra, note 141 at 200; and Kairys, supra, note 72 at 145-46.
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forbade any speech or writing that was critical of slavery. 146 There
is, of course, no need to document the involvement of legal
personnel with the Ku Klux Klan, and more importantly, how law
ignored their murderous activities. No prosecutions were ever
brought as a result of the massacre at Attica prison.
Of particular relevance is the thoroughness of American legal
violence towards labour movements, which have proven to be one
of the most potent radical (destabilizing) forces in the history of
America. Legal violence was essential to curb the threat they posed.
In the early 1800s, the courts punished both strikes and unions 1 as
47
being criminal conspiracies and imposed very harsh sentences.
Between 1873 and 1879, peaceful labour demonstrations were
regularly and violently broken up by the police. The fate of the
"Wobblies" at the hands of the police and vigilante violence is (I
hope) well known.
*As we move into the 1980s, the American State has managed
to become even more efficient in its use of violence. On May 13,
1985, the Philadelphia police fired over 10,000 rounds of
ammunition and dropped explosives from a helicopter onto the
headquarters of a radical Black organization called MOVE resulting
in a fire which killed 11 people, five of them children, and
destroying 61 other houses.148 The "city of brotherly love" somehow
failed to live up to its reputation.
And what of Canada?
Historically, Canadians have perceived themselves and their
nation as docile, moderate, compromising, conciliatory and tolerant.
In particular, they have counterposed themselves with their
American neighbours, whose revolutionary history, genocidal policies
against the native peoples, vigilantism, individualism and intolerance

146 Kairys, ibid at 146-48.
147 Ibid. See also Mark Kelman, 'The Origins of Crime and Criminal Violence" in
Kairys, supra, note 72 at 214, 218.
148 Philidelphia Special Investigation Commission, "The Findings, Conclusions and

Recommendations of the Philadelphia Special Investigation Commission" (1986) 59 Temple
L.Q. 339.
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stands in stark contrast to the northern "peaceable kingdom."1 49

Critical historical research, however, suggests that this self
perception is more myth than reality and that legal violence in
Canada has been anything but uncommon.
Pre-Confederation Canada had more than its fair share of
violence, particularly that of the State variety. Recent research
indicates that the Nova Scotia of the mid to late eighteenth century
was a veritable police state.150 The rather pathetic rebellion of 1814
invoked a harsh response from the authorities leading to mass
arrests, imprisonment or banishment, and the eventual execution of
at least eight of the participants during the "Ancaster Bloody
Assize."1 51 Three others died of goal fever in the ensuing winter.152
One can also be skeptical about the peaceful nature of postConfederation Canada. The Northwest Rebellion of 1885, the
second Riel rising (again, a rather pathetic affair), was confronted
with a military response of nearly 8,000 troops under the command
of General Middleton. Although there is some confusion about the

149 W. Kilbourn, ed., Canada: A Guide to the PeaceableKingdom (Toronto: McMillan,
1970).
150 Louise Anderson, "Crowd Activity in Nova Scotia During the American Revolution"
(M.A. Thesis, Dept. of History, Queen's University, Kingston, 1986) [unpublished].
151 William Renwick Riddal in M. Zaslow, ed., The Defended Border (Toronto:
Macmillan, 1964) at 241; Barry Wright, "The Ideological Dimensions of Law in Upper Canada:
The Treason Proceedings of 1814 and 1838" at 55 [forthcoming].
152 Historical evidence on this era of Canadian history is sparse and Wright, in
particular, has done an excellent research job in putting together this unattractive side of
Canadian legal history. It almost appears that there has been a conscious desire to forget
these blemishes on Canada's virginal history. Kenneth McNaught, in discussing the treason
trials, argues that the legal system was lenient, benign and merciful to the traitors. "Political
Trials and the Canadian Political Tradition" in M. Friedland, ed., Courts and Trials (Toronto,
University of Toronto Press, 1975) at 137. But once again, it should be noticed that the
merciful response came after the fact, once the threat (if there was one) had passed. As
Wright persuasively argues, with regards to the 1838 trials, "the prosecutions and punishments
were carefully calculated to maximize the deterrent effect, and show symbolic public display
of justice and the legitimacy of authority in politically unstable situations." Ibid. at 64. The
socio-political effect of punishment was the primary concern of officialdom. Ibid. at 69-84.
Wright does appear to admit that there was a subtle interplay of both repression and mercy
at work; but he also recognizes, although he fails to emphasize it sufficiently, that mercy could
only ride on the back of successful repression after the most important lesson had been taught.
The story is familiar the importance of the preservation of order and the restoration of
stability; ruthless deterrence reinforced by mercy; and ultimately self-fulfilling legitimation.
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death toll15 3 it is clear that the vast majority were rebels who were
killed either in battle or through judicial execution. Eight Metis
1 54
were hung for murder, and Riel was executed for high treason.
Many others were imprisoned.
Other dissident groups have also felt the "iron heel" of the
Canadian State. When the citizens of Quebec City protested against
conscription and the Military Service Act during the Easter weekend
of 1918, several hundred troops from Toronto were moved into the
city, once again, to restore order. Their tactics included cavalry
charges (with swords drawn) and the use of rifles and machine guns,
resulting in the death of four civilians and seriously injuring many
more - at least 70 required treatment by doctors. A further sixtytwo were arrested. 155 Elsewhere, conscientious objectors were
subjected to violence while being held in Minto Prison.156 The
emerging Communist Party of Canada was subjected to widespread
harassment and violence during the 1920s and 1930s. 157 Over 100
prominent communists were interned during the Second World
War.158 One might be tempted to believe that state violence is past

153 Thomas Flanagan, Riel and the Revolution of 1885 Reconsidered (Saskatoon: Western
Producers Prairie Books, 1983) suggests that about 100 died. Judy Torrance, Public Violence
in Canada (Kingston: McGill-Queens, 1986) puts the figure at about 200.
154 Torrance, ibid at 21.
155 Elizabeth Armstrong, The Crisis of Quebec, 1914-1918 (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1937).
156 Martin Robin, Radical Politics and Canadian Labour, 1890-1930 (Kingston, Ont.:
Industrial Relations Centre, Queen's University, 1968) at 156.
157 See for example, Lita-Rose Betcherman, The Little Band (Ottawa:

Deneau

Publishers, 1983); Ivan Avakumovic, The Communist Party in Canada (Toronto: McClelland
Stewart, 1975); Oscar Ryan, Tim Buck. A Consciencefor Canada (Toronto: Progress Books,
1975); R.A. Adams, '"ne 1931 Arrest and Trial of the Leaders of the Communist Party of
Canada" Canadian History Association, Fredericton, N.B., 1973; Frank Scott, "The Trial of the
Toronto Communists" [1932] Queens Q. 512; "Communists, Senators and All That" Canadian
Forum (Dec. 1931) 127.
158 Ryan, ibid.
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history and that "things are getting better." This would be a
mistake, as Toronto's homosexual community can attest. 159
In view of the immigrant nature of Canadian society,
deportation has proved to be a very useful (and cheap) technique
for dealing with social dissidents. It was first widely used after the
Winnipeg General Strike when a bill amending the Immigration Act
(allowing for the deportation of British subjects who had not been
born in Canada) was passed through in the House of Commons in
twenty minutes and within one hour had been accepted by the
Senate and given Royal Assent. 16 Ryan has estimated that between
1931 and 1933, 10,000 foreign born and British workers were
deported.1 61 The period can be characterized as one of deportation
delirium. Similarly, at least 12,000 people of Japanese origin were
moved from British Columbia to inland concentration camps during
the Second World War. 162 Furthermore, the Doukhoubors, and
their militant Sons of Freedom faction, despite their consciously
limited attacks on property, have been subjected to the mass
imprisonment of men, women and children, deportation, and physical
violence.1 63 More recently, one elderly woman activist has died on
a prison hunger strike. Violence is a way of life in the ever-swelling
1 64
Canadian prison system.
When no more than one hundred members of the F.L.Q.
took the cause of French Canadians beyond the pale of

159 Gerald Hannon documents that in the course of the raids on Toronto bath houses
not only were 337 arrests made but also there were widespread complaints of brutality. When
the raids were followed by public demonstrations by the gay community the police responded
with both direct violence and acquiescence in "queer bashing." "Raids, Rage and Bawdy
Houses" in Jackson & Persky eds, FlauntingIt! (Vancouver. New Star Books, 1982).
160 See Martin Robin, supra, note 156 at 181.
161 Supra, note 157 at 160.
162 For a classic example of the judiciary reinforcing and legitimizing state violence by
taking refuge in legal technicalities, see Japanese Reference, [1947] A.C. 87 (J.C.P.C.).
163 G. Woodcock & I. Avacumovic, The Doukhoubors (Toronto: McClelland Stewart,
1977).
164 Michael Jackson, Prisonersof Isolation (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983).
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acceptability, the government's response was swift and determined.1 65
Under the auspices of the rapidly resurrected War MeasuresAct, 500

people were arrested, 450 of whom were subsequently released
without charge, and 7,500 troops were mobilized into the
province.166 Pierre Trudeau provided a purely Hobbesian defence
of the invocation of the Act. He argued:
I think society must take every means at its disposal to defend itself against
everyone of a parallel power which
defies the elected power of this country, and I
167
think this goes to any distance.
Life is confrontation and vigilance and a fierce struggle against any threat of
intrusion or death. We are unworthy of our ideal if we are not ready to defend,
as you would life itself, the only roads to change that respect the human person.
We are equally unworthy if we are not able to harden ourselves temporarily, but
for as long that may be necessary - however repugnant it may be to do so - in
order to safeguard
and strengthen our democratic institutions and our highly
16 8
evolved society.

Once again, however, it is labour relations which provide the
litmus test for determining the limited tolerance of Canadian liberal
society. Challenging conventional wisdom, Jamieson argues:
Canada, during this century, has been a country having a record of labour unrest
and industrial conflict with legal and violent overtones second only to the U.S. and
far greater than that of most Western European countries.1 6 9

State violence has been widespread in industrial relations.

Robin

has estimated that between 1876 and 1914 there were at least 33
interventions and strikes by the military exclusively on behalf of the
employers. 170 One particularly vivid example is the response of
165

Once again, it should be remembered that they tended to restrict the vast majority
of their activity to the destruction of property.
166 It is to be noted that Pierre Laporte was not killed until the day after the War
Measures Act had been invoked.
167 Toronto Daily Star (14 October 1970).
168 For an in-depth critique of the Trudeau-Bourassa defence, see Dennis Smith, Bleeding
Hearts,Bleeding Country: Canada and the Quebec Crisis (Edmonton:
c. 5.

M.G. Hurtig, 1971) at

169 Supra, note 108 at 4.
170 Supra, note 156; see also Jamieson, supra, note 108 for a detailed discussion of a
plethora of incidents.
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government to the steel workers strike in Sydney, Nova Scotia in
1923. Not only did the strikers have to deal with 400 "goons" who
had been hired by the management, they had to deal with 2,000
uniformed soldiers and policemen who charged and rode into 1,000
strikers. For symbolic and educational purposes, leaders of the
strike were given particularly harsh prison sentences.1 71 State
violence was decisive at both Winnipeg 191972 and Regina 1935.1 73
Throughout recent Canadian history picket line violence (reinforced
by a partial judiciary) has been constant. To mention just a few
incidents: Fort William 1909, Brockville 1910, Estevan 1931, Corbin
1935, Vancouver 1935, Oshawa 1937, Windsor 1945, Asbestos 1949,
Louisville 1952, Murdochville 1957, Quebec 1968, Montreal 1972,

Newfoundland 1986, and the Gainer's Strike 1986.174 Furthermore,
responsibility for such violence lies not with the labour movement
but with the state - labour has been doubly victimized:
On numerous occasions in Canadian history the enactment of specially punitive
legislation or the use of police or military forces in anticipation of threatened
actions by organized labour have been the cause of, or at least the occasion for,
overt conflict. That is to say, aggressive or violent action by various labour groups

171 Tim Buck, Thirty Years, 1922-1952, The Story of the Communist Movement itCanada
(Toronto: Progress Books, 1952) at 42-43; and John Mellor, The Company Store (Toronto:
Doubleday, 1983).
172 Walter D. Young, Democracy and Discontent (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1969) at 1721; and D.C. Masters The Wmnipeg General Strike (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1950) recognizes the short-term effect of the suppression of the strike:
[It] continued for a short-time longer in an atmosphere of gathering doom. Most
of the leaders, although on bail, had undertaken to resume activity. Those who
had not been arrested were afraid that the blow would fall ....
Reduced to a state
of terror the Trades and Labour Council capitulated and ordered the end of the
strike....
Ibid. at 110.
Jamieson, with the benefit of hindsight, has observed the long-term paralysing effect of the
Government's response as "mark[ing] the beginning of a long decline in the size effectiveness
and militancy of organized labour in Canada." Supra, note 108 at 186.
173 R. Liversidge, Recollections of the On to Ottawa Trek (Toronto: McClelland Stewart,
1973).
174 Jamieson, supra, note 108 is the most comprehensive source. But see also Irving
Abella, ed., On Strike (Toronto: Lorimer, 1975). With regards to Quebec see Cot6, Latouche
et Loopstra, "Violence dans les
Conflits ouvriers" (1968) and Carla Lipsig Mumme, 'The Web
of Dependence: Quebec Unions in Politics before 1976" in Alain Gagnon, ed., Quebec: State
and Society (Toronto: Methuen, 1984).
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has often been provoked by resentment against the use of armed forces or the

discriminatory and one sided support provided by governments to employers.75

Nor should we seek refuge in the proposition that these are
historical aberrations, unfortunate deviations in an otherwise
laudable political evolution. Such strategies of confession and denial
only serve to perpetuate the legitimization of domination. Consider
the current question of the position of Canada's First Nations. In
their quest for self-determination and equality, the Native peoples
pose what is, perhaps, one of the most serious challenges to the
legitimacy of the political and military elites of Canadian society.
From Labrador to the Queen Charlotte Islands, from Cape Breton
to Northern Alberta, from Southern Quebec to Northern Ontario,
Native peoples have challenged the military, political and economic
interests of those in power. On each and every occasion the
response has been unequivocal: the invocation of the violent power
of the state, via mass arrests. Yet the vast majority of non-Native
Canadians seem unperturbed by this almost daily repression of a
quest for survival. Less obvious - and perhaps the more damning
for that - are the statistics that reveal the vastly disproportionate
over-representation of Native people in what we euphemistically call
our criminal justice system.176 Could anyone seriously contend that
this blatantly excessive incarceration is not related to factors such as
native non-conformity with the dominant culture and class position?
Thus, the peaceable kingdom is a chimera, a historical fiction, which
only exists because of a collectively self-imposed myopia, the will not
to know.
As the forgoing discussion demonstrates, challenges to the
interests of the power bloc - both real and perceived - are always

portrayed as a threat to law and order. The capacity of Law to
perform this ideological feat in turn presents legal violence as a
legitimate resolution of the problem. Criminalization of the people
and the acts threatening the status quo legitimates the violence
which is used against them. This is not instrumentalism. It is not
law as a tool in the hands of the bourgeoisie; rather it is law, the
175 Jamieson, supra, note 108 at 19.
176 M. Jackson, Locking Up Natives in Canada: A Report of the Committee of the
CanadianBarAssociation on Imprisonment and Release (1988).
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people, the principles, and the rules, as part of the process of
human interaction. Tie people who make and enforce the rules are
social beings who have a position in the flux of human
interrelations. They see their society threatened by disruptive
elements: the poor, the Blacks, the lazy, the spongers, the
recalcitrant or drunken Native, the anarchists or the commies. They
perceive a cloud of chaos shadowing their lives. Contrary to some
instrumentalist critiques, their motivations do not arise out of a bad
faith, or conscious bias, but rather out of fear. It is not a great
conspiracy that leads to the resort to legal violence; rather, it is
people living their lives in accordance with their ideology, their
sense of reality, who see their world menaced.177 They will fight to
preserve that world, that reality. The institutions, the personnel and
the rules of law exist for this reason: to protect the status quo.
Violence is as endemic to modern law as either ideology or
facilitation.
The arsenal of legal violence is expansive. First, there are
the visibly obvious acts of violence involved in public
demonstrations: foot charges and cavalry charges, baton charges and
even sword charges, and the use of anti-personnel gases. Physical
combat between individual police officers and individual
demonstrators is common, as are violent arrests and the use of dogs
against protestors.178 There are also less visible police activities:
the more normal arrests, in particular dawn raids, or the police
killing of suspects who have tried to "escape arrest."1 79 Lead,
177 Several sociological-psychological studies of police attitudes indicate
that they see
themselves as the last line of defence against chaos; the thin blue line in a hostile

environment. See for example, W. A. Westley, Violence and Police (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT
Press, 1970); J.Q. Wilson, Varietiesof PoliceBehaviour (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 1968); S. Holdaway, Inside the British Police (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983); P. K.
Manning, Police Work (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1977). See also C. 3. Vick, "Explaining
Police Pessimism" and R. C. Adam, 'The Police Personality" both in D. W. Pope & N. L.
Weiner eds, Modem Policing (London: Croom Helm, 1981); and P. Gorman & A. Coleman,

"Conservatism, Dogmatism and Authoritarianism in British Police Officers" (1982) 16(1)
Sociology 1; M. Brogden, Police, Autonomy and Consent (London: Academic Press, 1982).
178 Dogs proved particulary useful to the police during the miners strike in Britain.
179 D. Chappell & L. Graham, Police Use of Deadly Force (Toronto: Centre of
Criminology, 1985). This excellent, and controversial, report documents that between 1970
and 1981, one hundred and twenty five people have been killed by the police in Canada. As
the authors point out, this demonstrates a contradiction in Canadian politico-legal psyche; on
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plastic, and rubber bullets have proved to be particularly cost
effective. Deaths in custody appear to be more frequent than we
would like to admit.18 0 The military, usually with much less subtlety,
carry out similar activities (plus many other covert actions) when
181
called upon to support the police in the preservation of order.
The judiciary also participate in legal violence. Judges often
acquiesce in the prosecution's use of the safety net charge of
conspiracy.1 8 2 They have recourse to "contempt of court" for those
who refuse to recognize the majesty of the law. They set bail at
such high levels that defendants cannot possibly comply and thus
they put into effect a version of preventative detention.1 8 3 They
utilize legislation, such as emergency legislation, which is designed to
destroy dissident groups. They reinterpret a host of non-political
crimes against delicts in order to "keep them out of circulation."
When the Black Panther movement overtly challenged the American
system, the courts were able to use at least 57 offences, most of
which were "non-political," to convict the Panthers.18 4 The courts
imprison strikers and picketers, particularly through the use of
injunctions1 8 5 Indeed, Winnipeg, during the general strike, was
known as Injunction City. Legislation is adapted in order to convict

a symbolic level Canada rejects the death penalty as inappropriate, even for the most heinous
crime, yet interstitially s.25(4) of the Ciminal Code empowers the police to "legitimately' kill
in the course of effecting an arrest. Once again the rhetoric cloaks the reality, especially when
it is revealed that:
many victims of police shootings were taking flight to avoid arrest for non-violent
offences when injured or killed, many were unarmed and none were armed with
traditional lethal weapons such as guns or knives.
180 Phil Scraton, "Deaths in Custody" (1986) 13 Brit. J. L.; and S. Oakland Ross,
"Picket's Death Adds to Cloud over Quebec Police" Globe & Mail (6 November 1986).
181 We may also be witnessing the emergence of a new intermediate paramilitary police
force. In England, it takes the form of the S.P.G.'s; in Canada it goes by the name of
S.E.R.T.
182 See J.A.G. Griffith, The Politics of the Judiciary, 3d ed. (Glasgow: Fontana, 1985)

c. 6.
183 Balbus, supra, note 141; and Millar & Fine, supra, note 144.
184 Allan Wolfe, The Seamy Side of Democracy: Repression in America (New York, David

McKay, 1975) at 50-51.
185 Millar & Fine, supra, note 144; Panitch & Schwartz, supra, note 77.
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political opponents.18 6
Finally, the legislature, the seat of
democracy, is acutely conscious that "the decisive means of politics
is violence. ''187 Thus, harassment, process and public order laws are
frequently passed.188 More overtly, resort may be had to emergency
legislation, which still carries the aura of legitimacy, since it
supposedly derives from the sovereign will of the people. There are
also the overtly political laws and overtly political trials.1 89
D. The Genius of Law
Your law always does more harm than the crime, and your morality is a form of
violence.
Edward Bond 190
[the prince] ought to be both feared and loved, but as it is difficult for tile two to
go together, it is much safer to be feared than loved, if one of the two has to be
wanting.
Machiavelli1 91

It would be possible to continue ad nauseam with the
documentation of instances and types of legal violence. I hope that
I have said enough to refute the counter-positioning of law and
violence and to demonstrate both the reality and pervasiveness of
legal violence in contemporary western liberal-democratic society.
Though useful, my argument does not make much progress on either
a theoretical or practical level. I have not said enough about the
relationship between the various legal functions. Specifically, my
argument has a fundamental weakness, it indulges in setting up
186 For example, it was the American Supreme Court which used the Sherman Anti-tntst
legislation to convict Eugene Debs, the I.W.W. leader.
187 Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation" in H.H. Gerth & C.W. Mills eds, From Max
Weber: Essays in Sociology (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970) at 78.
188 Some of the more obvious Canadian examples are laws against obstructing the police,
assaulting the police, resisting arrest, escaping lawful custody, obstructing justice, causing a
disturbance and breach of the peace. Nor should we forget Canada's infamous s.98.
189 See, for example, Otto Kircheimer, PoliticalJustice (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1961); and Peter Hain, Political Trials in Britain (London: Penguin, 1985).
190 Lear speaking in Edward Bond, Lear, supra, note 1 at 85.
191 N. Machiavelli, The Prince, trans. L. Ricci, 1952 (1st ed. Florence 1513) at 90.
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dichotomies. It works on the premise of the couplet "consent or
coercion," an approach which is inadequate. The relationship
between law as ideology (which also includes the facilitative role of
law) and law as violence cannot be grasped by their mere
conjunction or addition. In brief, an analysis which only goes so far
as to argue that law can be either ideological or violent, or
ideological and violent, does not do enough.
Both Gramsci and Lenin recognized as much. Lenin was not
as instrumentalist as his State and Revolution 92 might suggest.
Indeed, he has clearly specified an approach which incorporates both
hegemonic and coercive aspects:
The worldwide experience of bourgeois and landowner governments has evolved two

methods of keeping people in subjection. The first is violence, with which the Tsars
demonstrated to the Russian people the maximum of what can and cannot be done.

But there is another method, best developed by British and French bourgeoisie ...
the method of deception, flattery, fine phrases, promises by the 1million,
petty sops
93

and concessions of the unessential, while retaining the essential.

Gramsci was also very aware that law fulfilled both educative and
coercive functions:
If every state tends to create and maintain a certain type of civilization ... and to
eliminate certain customs and certain attitudes, and to disseminate others, then the
law will be its instrument for this purpose.1 9 4

This either/or analysis was rather cryptically (re)introduced to left
jurisprudence in the late 1960s by Louis Althusser when he
suggested that,
Very subtle, explicit or tacit combinations may be woven from the interplay of
Repressive State Apparatuses and the Ideological State Apparatuses?1 9 5

This "combinatory approach" is made most explicit by Stuart Hall,
et al. who followed through the logic of the argument. Drawing on

192 (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1976).
193 Collected Works, Vol. 24 at 63-64.

194 S.P.N., supra, note 30 at 246.
195 "Ideological State Apparatuses" in ForMarx (New York: Pantheon Books, 1970) at
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various Gramscian concepts,1 96 they argue that if hegemony is
complete or nearly complete, law plays a strong ideological role, but
if hegemony is weak, law plays a coercive role. They develop a
temporal sequence, suggesting a transition from moments of
constraint to moments of consent, back to moments of constraint.
The metaphor they develop is that of a pendulum movement or a
hydraulic piston; when consensus breaks down, there is a greater
reliance on legal coercion.
The analysis is moving in a correct direction, but is
problematic. The methodology looks at the quantity (extent) of
hegemonic leadership or direction, and quantity (extent) of coercion
or violence. It implies that the greater the violence, the less the
spontaneous consent; it implies that the two are variables that
mutually adjust in automatic response. It is a zero-sum approach; as
one increases, the other necessarily decreases. This approach fails,
in my opinion, to capture the genius of law.
Law does many things in modern society: it creates a world
which obscures the harshness of social relations and legitimates
oppression. It diffuses potential dissent and creates an acceptable
level of exploitation. It even provides real benefits for most
members of society, even though these do not accrue equally. Law,
by removing some of the excesses of exploitation, by mediating the
disadvantages of current society, contributes, in the long run, to the
continuance of the inherent inequality since it smooths out the
jagged edges, and encourages acquiesence. Yet its genius lies in
none of these. Law's genius lies in its ability to make two acts,
which are essentially the same, morally different. Law makes legal
violence legitimate, and illegal violence illegitimate; violence which
is legal becomes acceptable in the popular psyche, even when used
against those whose dissent is peaceful. Because there must be
dissent within a capitalist social formation, there must always be a
need for social control. Ideology is inherently incapable of
transcending the factors of disequilibrium; instability will surface, and
"when in doubt" those who have been threatened by social instability
will "lash out." Legal relations are carried out by such people. Law
has a very human face with very human instincts. Law is people in
196 Policingthe Crisis, supra, note 131 at 209. The phrase is theirs.
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action, but more important, it is legal people in action, thus its
action appears to be legitimate. The genius of law stems from its
capacity for legal and legitimate violence. Law constitutionalizes
violence.
Stuart Hall et al, as representatives of the combinatory
analysis, cannot appreciate the genius of law. Their approach
underestimates the extent to which violence is endemic to all law in
the capitalist conjuncture. The crucial implication of their work is
that violence is only present when hegemony is weak, whereas I
have argued that violence is continually present in the law, even
though it may be rarely used. Legal violence and legal ideology coexist in a permanent, mutually reinforcing unity.
Violence is continually present in the law, whether it is used
frequently or infrequently. Violence in the law is not just oriented
towards revolutionaries, potential rebels or malcontents, rather it is
directed towards all of us. Legal violence stalks in the guise of
criminal law, the law against "normal crime." Once we recognize
this metamorphosis, the integral relationship between violence and
ideology becomes manifest because of the power of the threat of
legal violence. Few people are unaware of the extent of the arsenal
of legal violence. One is continually made conscious, through the
police on the beat, through the media, through the courts, (by
policies such as "deterrent" sentencing), and finally through personal
experience, of the effectiveness of legal violence. The act and
threat of violence has a double effect: first, it removes either
temporarily or permanently, certain individuals; second, and more
importantly, it modifies the conduct of other people. In brief, law,
through legal violence, effectively used and even more effectively
publicized, terrorizes us all into acquiescence. Few of us are willing
to give up our lives, livelihoods or reputations or a counter-cultural
political cause.
Contrary to what both Hall and Poulantzas argue, this is
neither "an exceptional moment" nor "new authoritarian statism."
Rather it is a constant aspect of modern social relations. At best,
it is "permanent exceptionalism. 197 The point is that violence and
threats of violence are perceived as legitimate because of the

197 Panitch & Swartz, supra, note 77 at c. 3.
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ideological function of law is operating simultaneously. "Repression
never comes unpackaged. 198
Legal violence is perceived as
legitimate violence, necessary for the preservation of "our shared
experience of democracy." The victims of legal violence, having
been criminalized, are then presented as disruptive elements or
troublemakers, thereby leading the rest of society to have little
solidarity with them. Legal violence is rarely widespread, since that
would create too much dissent and threaten the myth of consensus;
rather legal violence is usually selective and precise, bolstered
simultaneously by legal ideology. The zero-sum, hydraulic piston
image does not adequately catch this reality; the temporal approach
cannot be adequate as a critical theory because it fails to understand
the relation between the ideological and violent aspects of law.
From the point of view of the victims of legal violence, any
theoretical distinction between the authoritarian and normal state
may be irrelevant; violence is violence.
There is another way in which we can understand the
nature of the relationship between violence and ideology. Althusser
and Poulantzas have drawn an important distinction between that
which is dominant and that which is determinative. 199 Dominant can
be understood as a quantitative concept while determinative can be
understood as a qualitative concept. "Dominance" suggests that
certain factors or concepts stand out as being the most significant
criteria. When this is applied to law the most significant (dominant)
thing about it is its claim to legitimacy. Law is, within current social
relations, a major arbiter of the limits of acceptability. This is what
makes law so effective in liberal democratic society and gives
importance to juridico-political ideology. However, this dominance
of the ideological aspect of law is not immune from social relations;
on the contrary, law as ideology is dominant only because of the
nature of current social relations. The analysis I have offered of
these relations is that they are overdetermined by (they have as
their fundamental priority) the imperative to reproduce the relations
of production, that is, to maintain the current social order. I have
198 Millar & Fine, supra, note 144 at 10.
199 "On Contradiction and Overdetermination" in For Marx (New York:
Books, 1976); and Poulantzas, S.P.S., supra, note 16 at 79.
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argued that the alienation, reification and exploitation engendered
by such an order necessarily fosters dissent, dissatisfaction and
protest. The priority is to preserve the status quo and when
confronted with discordance and heterodoxy, this can be achieved
only through resort to coercion and violence. In brief, the capacity
for violence, in particular legal violence, is what ultimately keeps
current society as it is. When "the chips are down," contemporary
society is based upon the capacity of violence to preserve things as
they are. Violence is determinative. Without the capacity to revert
to overt violence the current system of exploitation and domination
would crumble, for the simple reason that contradictory
consciousness would break through, changing the nature of social
interaction, and nothing could stop it.
This, however, cannot be any old violence; it must be legal
violence since it carries with it the requisite aura of legitimacy.
There has to be violence for the very same reason there has to be
consent: because of the universality and primacy of struggles based
on exploitation. Legal violence is continually present; it is a
foundation upon which social relations are built in a capitalist social
formation. As Poulantzas suggests,
State monopolized physical violence permanently underlies the techniques of power
and mechanisms of consent; it is inscribed in the web of disciplinary and ideological

devices; and even when not directly exercised, it shapes
the materiality of the social
200
body upon which domination is brought to bear.

Ideology may be the dominant role of law, and must
therefore merit great attention, but this ought not to obscure the
fact that, at least within the present politico-historical conjuncture,
violence is essential to maintain society and to control those who
challenge the social order. Law is that moment, that specific set of
social relations which has as its distinctive feature the capacity for
supreme yet legitimate overt violence. Ironically, James Fitzjames
200 Poulantzas, ibid. at 81. Indeed, even Douglas Hay, in an essay justly celebrated for
articulating the ideological role of law, is acutely conscious of the determinative role of legal

(legitimated) violence.
... when patronage failed force could be invoked, but when coercion inflamed men's

minds, at the crucial moment mercy could calm them. The sanction of the state
is force, but it is force that is legitimized however imperfectly, and therefore the
state also deals in ideologies.
Supra, note 128 at 62.
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Stephen is a great deal more honest than his apologist liberal
successors in admitting quite frankly that the criminal law is the
process by which "men (sic) rightfully, deliberately and in cold blood,
kill, enslave, and otherwise torment, their fellow creatures."201 Apart
from the word "rightfully" I would suggest that Stephen has correctly
described the lamentable truth of the end-game situation.
IV. IN GUISE OF A CONCLUSION
The real political task in a society such as ours is to criticize the workings of

institutions which appear to be both neutral and independent; to criticize and attack
them in such a manner that the political violence which has always exercised itself
obscurely through them will be unmasked, so that one can fight against them.
202
Noam Chomsky & Michel Foucault
In my beginning is my end.

T.S. Eliot2 0 3

This essay has been an attempt to "view (law) on a different
scale"204 from that accepted by conventional legal wisdom. In
positing the integral relationship between law, power and violence
I have attempted to introduce some clarity and honesty into our
thinking about law and legal practice. Interactionalism, in spite of
-

indeed because of -

its critical nature, is therapeutic and

liberating; it stimulates both consciousness and conscience. It
informs us that Liberalism has failed us as a community because its
response to humankind's fundamental dilemma - the antinomies of
mutual longing and mutual jeopardy, mutual need and mutual fear205
- has not been through the transcendence of coercion, but rather
201 G. Parker, "James Fitzjames Stephen: Some of his Correspondence' [1982] Now and
Then 63 at 85-86.
202 Chomsky and Foucault, "Human Nature: Justice versus Power" in F. Elder, Refleive
Water (London:

Souvenir Press, 1974) 170.

203 T.S. Eliot, "East Coker," Four Quartets in Collected Poems (1909-1962) (London:
Faber and Faber, 1963) 196.
204 Michel Foucault, 'The Order of Discourse" in M. Shapiro, ed., Language andPolitics

(New York: New York University Press, 1984) 108 at 111.
205 See Roberto Unger, Passion:An Essay on Personality(New York: Free Press, 1984);

Devlin, "Book Review" (1985) 11 Queen's LJ.295.
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the rationalization, institutionalization and constitutionalization of
violence. Therefore in order to escape the crushing weight of the
legitimized repression, to get from here to there, we must look
elsewhere, beyond the limits of liberalism.
That is the challenge.
But today I am pessimistic. My pessimism operates on two
levels.
First, I suggest that law fulfills another function not yet
discussed in this essay, what might be called an expressive or
communicative function. Law tells us something about both
ourselves and our society. Our addict-like dependency 206 upon an
intrinsically violent criminal law demonstrates the psychotic nature of
contemporary Canadian society. The criminal law is constitutively
incapable of resolving problems which are primarily social, political
and economic, yet because of a collectivized legal fetishism we
continually turn to this distraction in the hope that it will provide a
panacea. Recourse to criminal remedies demonstrates just how
myopic our vision is, how disempowered, paralysed and
unimaginative %ve have become. Any enlargement of the criminal
unless we see our redemption in
law cannot be for our benefit
20 7
authoritarianism.
increased
Second, I am pessimistic about our capacity to effectively
move from theory to praxis. What if we do recognize the alienation
and poverty of contemporary society and attempt to move beyond
critical legal theory towards practical, counter-hegemonic,
transformative action? My fear is that once any such move (if we
could even imagine it) becomes threatening, once it grows beyond
conceptual or embryonic form, once it manifests itself as concrete
action, then the activists involved become vulnerable to the dialectic
of hegemony and violence which, as I have argued, can be
devastatingly effective.
Yet pessimism is not nihilism. A critical skepticism should
not be confused with a fatalistic cynicism that would hurl us to the

206 Hans Mohr, "Criminal Law: Is There a Legal or Social Logic Left for Its Renewal"
in Patrick Fitzgerald, ed., Crimn4 Justice and Codification (Toronto: Carswell, 1986) 31 at 34-

35.
207 Ibid. at 49.
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politico-philosophical roots of liberalism with its necessitarian belief
that life and community must, inexorably, be "solitary, poor, nasty,
brutish and short."208
On the contrary, the critique, if fundamental enough, can
identify and begin to unpack some of our most deeply entrenched
assumptions, and most importantly, to interrogate whether such
assumptions must inevitably hold true. Or might it be that such
assumptions are in reality formative elements of a certain worldview
- a pervasive and hegemonic one perhaps, but still a worldview and therefore contingent, partial,20 9 and most importantly,
replaceable?
In two further articles, I attempt to push the critique
developed in this essay to its pessimistic nadir, and in so doing to
tentatively suggest that critical reflection on law only remains
pessimistic while working within the assumptions of the
contemporary paradigm. If, however, we begin to work beyond the
parameters of conventional wisdom, while at the same time
nurturing the plurality of deviations that render such conventionalism
unstable, we may just be able to conceive of another legal system,
one that refuses to accept violence as determinative of the nature
of law.
In these articles - one reviewing Unger's most recent
work,210 the other an analysis of recent feminist jurisprudential
debates211 - I begin to trace out the vialibility and potential
generative sources of a reconstructed legality that neither assumes
the permanence of liberalism nor accepts the totality of
androcentrism. I suggest that by disconnecting modern legal theory
and law from what, on reflection, are essentially very traditional

208 John Hobbes, Leviathan (London: Penguin, 1968) c. 13.

209 Following Martha Minow, I use "partial" in at least two of its senses: partisan and
incomplete. See Minow, "Partial Justice" [unpublished].
210 Book Review, "On the Road to Radical Reform: A Review Essay of Roberto
Mangabeira Unger's Politics" [forthcoming 28 Osgoode Hall LJ.].

211 "Nomos and Thanatos: Feminism as Jurisgenerative Transformation or Resistance
Through Partial Incorporation" [forthcoming 12 Dalhousie L.J.].
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assumptions - liberal individualism and malestream2 1 2 ideology - we
may be able to achieve a triple accomplishment: a dramatic opening
up of jurisprudential discourse; an avoidance of legal repression
through a transformation of the terms of the discourse and the
nature of the challenge; and, ultimately, the uncoupling of law from
violence. Although in neither instance has the reconstructive effort
been completely successful, 213 important practical, experiential and
theoretical developments have taken place that allow some scope for
cautious but critical optimism. The alternative to such an endeavour
is the cynically fatalistic strategy of confession and avoidance that,
for centuries, has legitimized repression: an admission that the
horizon of our community wisdom is punishment and violence,
hastily justified by a pseudo-essentialist cop-out that blames it all on
the impoverishment of our human creativity.
The contradictory virtue of a critical .consciousness of the
violence of law is that it refuses to allow us to acquiesce such
authoritarian apologetics ... and, in generating such resistance, it
inspires a politics of hope.

212 The term comes from Mary O'Brien, The Politicsof Reproduction (Boston: Routledge
& Kegan Paul, 1981).

213 One should not expect quick and easy solutions, given the oppressive tenacity of
liberalism and the patriarchal pervasiveness of androcentrism. See, in particular, C.
MacKinnon, "Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State: An Agenda for Theory' (1982) 7
Signs 515; and "Feminism, Marxism: Method and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence"

(1983) 8 Signs 635.

